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ABSTRACT
In many social-ecological systems, shared resources play a critical role in supporting the
livelihoods of rural populations. Physical infrastructure enables resource access and reduces
the variability of resource supply. In order for the infrastructure to remain functional, institu-
tions must incentivize individuals to engage in provision and maintenance. The objective of
my dissertation is to understand key formal and informal institutions that affect provision of
shared infrastructure and the policy tools that may improve infrastructure provision. I examine
these questions in the context of irrigation systems in India because infrastructure maintenance
is a persistent challenge and system function is critical for global food production.
My first study investigates how the presence of private infrastructure, such as groundwater
pumps, affects the provision of shared infrastructure, such as shared tanks or surface reservoirs.
I examine whether formal institutions, such as water pricing instruments, may prevent under-
provision of the shared tanks. My findings suggest that in the absence of rules that coordinate
tank maintenance, the presence of private pumps will have a detrimental effect on system pro-
ductivity and equality. On the other hand, the combination of a fixed groundwater fee and a
location-based maintenance fee for tank users can improve system productivity and equality.
The second study examines the effect of power asymmetries between farmers, caused by
informal institutions such as caste, on the persistence of political institutions that govern infras-
tructure provision. I examined the effect of policy tools, such as non-farm wage employment
and informational interventions, on the persistence of two types of political institutions: self-
governed and nested. Results suggest that critical regime shifts in political institutions can be
generated by either intervening in formal institutions, such as non-farm wage employment, or
informal institutions, such as knowledge transmission or learning mechanisms.
The third study investigates how bureaucratic and political corruption affect public good
provision. I examine how institutional and environmental factors affect the likelihood of cor-
i
ruption and infrastructure provision. I demonstrate that cracking down on corruption is only
beneficial when infrastructure provision is poor. I also show that bureaucratic wages play an
important role in curbing extralegal transactions and improving infrastructure provision.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In many social-ecological systems, shared resources play a critical role in supporting the
livelihoods of rural populations. Examples of such systems include irrigated agriculture, com-
munity forestry, and coastal fisheries. In these systems, human interactions with the resources
are mediated by physical infrastructure, which is often consciously designed by humans and en-
ables access to the resource (Anderies, 2015). Examples of such physical infrastructure include
irrigation canals, fishing gear, etc.
A fundamental problem faced by human societies concerns the provision and maintenance
of shared physical infrastructure (Cárdenas et al., 2017). Provision decisions may include
whether or not to participate in construction and cleaning of shared irrigation canals, in refor-
estation, or in using appropriate fishing gear that protects fish. Often, individual provision
decisions depend on the proportional equivalence between the benefit of resource appropria-
tion and cost of provision (Ostrom, 1990). Designing institutions that shape these incentives
is, therefore, a critical endeavor.
Numerous empirical cases suggest that institutions can effectively manage provision of
shared infrastructure. A few examples of such cases include irrigation communities in India
and Nepal (Bardhan, 2000; Lam and Ostrom, 2010), small-scale fisheries in Northwest Mex-
ico (Lindkvist et al., 2017), and forests in the middle hills of Nepal (Gautam and Shivakoti,
2005). These cases provide an important foundation for understanding institutional designs
that succeed in mitigating the emergence of dilemmas regarding provision of shared infras-
tructure. However, to apply these lessons more broadly, we need to understand how and why
institutions are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate in diverse settings.
1
In this dissertation, I will attempt to address these objectives by analyzing small-scale irrigation
systems in India.
Small-scale irrigation systems, which are used by nearly 84% of farms worldwide (Lowder
et al., 2016), contribute to nearly 40% of the world’s food production (Bruinsma, 2017). In
India, a country that holds nearly a quarter of the world’s agricultural land, 44% of the land is
under irrigation (Gleeson and Wada, 2013). Agriculture contributes to nearly 20% of India’s
Gross Domestic Product (Bhattacharya, 2017). In order to improve agricultural productivity,
the Indian government has investedmore than $10 billion since 1990, to repair, rehabilitate, and
build irrigation infrastructure (Shah, 2009; Smilovic et al., 2015). Yield and water productivity,
however, continue to decline due to poor irrigation infrastructure (Shah, 2009) and concern for
food insecurity and inequity is increasing.
Several factors affect the provision of irrigation infrastructure and these may be understood
through a coupled infrastructure systems (CIS) approach. Figure 1 shows the CIS framework,
which has been adapted from Anderies (2015) to understand how the interactions between irri-
gators and irrigation water are mediated by institutions, irrigation infrastructure, and irrigation
agencies. I will explore different components of this framework in my thesis to broadly under-
stand (i) the key political-economic factors that affect the incentives to maintain shared irriga-
tion infrastructure, and (ii) the policy instruments that may improve the provision of irrigation
infrastructure.
Chapter 2 examines how private infrastructure affects provision of shared infrastructure.
It explores how private infrastructure affects individuals’ incentives to engage in provision
of shared infrastructure as well as the corresponding effect on overall resource availability. I
operationalize this broad research question by examining how groundwater pumps affect the
collective maintenance of surface reservoirs in tank irrigation systems in South India (Mosse,
2008). The focus of this chapter is on links 1, 4, and 6 in Figure 1.
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Resource Users:
• Irrigators
Private Groundwater
Pumps
Public Infrastructure:
1) Shared canals, tanks, etc.
2) Water Allocation Rules
3) Maintenance Rules
4) Irrigation Bureau/Bureaucrats, etc.
Public Infrastructure
Providers:
1)Water User Associations
2)Politicians, etc.
Resource:
• Irrigation Water
1 2
6
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5
Figure 1. The Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) Framework. Adapted from (Anderies,
2015) to represent an irrigation system.
For those that are able to invest in private infrastructure, access to private pumps may
reduce reliance on shared infrastructure and, therefore, the importance of its maintenance. This
can negatively impact the groups of irrigators that still rely on the shared infrastructure for their
water (Ostrom, 2003), and reinforce the adoption of groundwater pumps (Palanisami, 2006).
The tension between provision of shared infrastructures and adoption of private infrastructure
is a problem that also persists in other types of systems. One example is the problem of the
utility-death spiral in the electricity industry (Castaneda et al., 2017). As adoption of solar PV
by households (private technology) increases, utility companies increase tariffs to compensate
for reduced revenue in order to be able to maintain the grid (shared infrastructure). This further
prompts solar PV adoption. There has been relatively little work on which types of policy
interventions are required to improve the provision of public goods in these contexts.
I developed a stylized replicator dynamic model to investigate the effects of pricing in-
struments, such as volumetric fees, on the maintenance of the shared tanks in systems where
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users have access to private groundwater pumps. I demonstrate that the combination of a fixed
groundwater fee and a volumetric fee on tank users that is differentiated based on where users
are located in the system can improve system productivity and equality.
Chapter 3 examines how heterogeneity among resource users determines the political in-
stitutions that persist in an irrigation system and the resulting effect on provision of irrigation
infrastructure. Heterogeneity refers to the social stratification of users determined by cultural
norms, such as caste, that may lead to power asymmetries among resource users (Ruttan, 2006).
The focus of this chapter is also on links 1, 4, and 6 in Figure 1.
Much of the literature on institutions recognizes their importance for economic perfor-
mance in a society (North, 1994; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). There is limited understand-
ing, however, of what determines the persistence of institutions. Specifically, how does the
presence of power asymmetries in a system affect the persistence of political institutions that
govern public good provision? To answer this question, I developed a stylized compartmental
model that traces the institutional choice of individuals in an irrigation system. Using this men-
tal model of elites and non-elites, I examined the effect of policy tools, such as non-farm wage
employment and informational interventions, on the persistence of two political institutions:
self-governed and nested. I demonstrate that critical regime shifts in political institutions can
be generated by either intervening in formal institutions, such as non-farm wage employment,
or informal institutions, such as knowledge transmission or learning mechanisms in the system.
I also show that in systems where public infrastructure depreciates at a given rate, changes in
the rate of learning in mental models of elites relative to the rate of infrastructure decay can
result in a shift to political institutions that enable better infrastructure provision. This is con-
trary to situations in which elites’ mental models are strongly influenced by non-economic
considerations, such as their cultural beliefs, and the system persists in political institutions
with inferior infrastructure provision (Baker, 2011).
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In Chapter 4, I examine how public infrastructure providers determine the level of infras-
tructure provision in a system facing environmental shocks. I operationalize this research ob-
jective by examining how the presence of extralegal side payments between politicians and
bureaucrats affects the provision of irrigation infrastructure in a government-managed irriga-
tion system. The focus of this chapter is on links 3, 6, and 2 in Figure 1.
Irrigation reform discussions focused on enhancing the role of bureaucrats have previously
dissociated politics from their analysis and assumed benevolence on the part of the bureaucrat
(Moe, 2006). However, research shows that in developing countries like India, infrastructure
provision efforts of bureaucrats can be affected by the demands for extralegal payments by
their superiors (Muneepeerakul and Anderies, 2017). In this case, the superior is the politician
(Wade, 1982). Through these side payments, bureaucrats are guaranteed their jobs even if they
undersupply the public good. Failure to comply with their superior’s demands, however, can
result in the bureaucrat’s removal from office. On the other hand, the politician’s incentives
to demand extralegal side payments are shaped by the electorate, or the irrigators, who require
the irrigation infrastructure to be functional for their livelihoods.
I developed a stylized principal-agent model to examine how institutional and environmen-
tal factors affect (i) the likelihood of corruption, and (ii) the provision of infrastructure. My
model results suggest that a crackdown on extralegal side payments can result in lower provi-
sion of infrastructure when the system experiences high uncertainty in environmental shocks
to the infrastructure. In other words, cracking down on corruption is only beneficial when in-
frastructure provision is bad. I also show that bureaucratic wages play an important role in
curbing extralegal transactions and improving infrastructure provision.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarize my findings, and outline the theoretical and practical
implications for irrigation policy in India.
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Chapter 2
EFFECT OF PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE PROVISION OF SHARED
IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH INDIA
2.1 Introduction
In many social-ecological systems (SES), shared infrastructure mediates interactions between
humans and resources. For example, smallholder agricultural systems, which are important
for food security and economic growth in many developing countries (World Bank, 2008), de-
pend on irrigation infrastructure through which farmers appropriate water. Though tradition-
ally, resource users relied upon shared infrastructure to access resources in a SES, increasing
resource scarcity and changing opportunity costs have made private infrastructure more desir-
able. A core problem in these SESs is that people who still rely on shared infrastructure for
their livelihoods are now faced with the challenge of maintaining livelihoods because the shift
to private infrastructure is often made at the expense of the shared infrastructure. How does
the presence of private infrastructure affect the ability of individuals to solve collective action
problems related to the provision of shared infrastructure and distribution of resources? What
policy instruments are required for improving the provision of shared infrastructure under these
circumstances? This study examines these questions using a stylized model of a small-scale ir-
rigated agricultural system. This is important because half a billion people manage agriculture
systems around the world rely on shared infrastructure (Frenken and Gillet, 2012; Suhardiman
and Giordano, 2014).
In many small-scale irrigation systems, agricultural productivity depends heavily on the
quality of shared irrigation infrastructure, such as tanks (or surface reservoirs), canals, and
weirs. Three empirical findings emerge from a comparative case-study analysis of such sys-
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tems. First, is the social dilemma associated with provision of public goods, such as canals
and related irrigation infrastructure (Olson, 1993; Janssen et al., 2011; Muneepeerakul and An-
deries, 2017; Cárdenas et al., 2017). Second, is the dilemma associated with appropriation of
commons, such as groundwater (Burness and Brill, 2001; Hellegers et al., 2001; Cody et al.,
2015; Smith et al., 2017). Third, is the challenge of efficient distribution of water in irriga-
tion systems with asymmetric access to the resource (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; David et al.,
2015).
The literature highlights the feedbacks between individuals’ provision and appropriation
decisions given the dependence on shared infrastructure in a system. However, individuals
using private infrastructure to access a resource may also negatively affect the provision of the
shared infrastructure (Ostrom, 2003). For example, adoption of private groundwater pumps
may result in reduced maintenance of shared infrastructure, such as reservoirs and canals. On
the other hand, poor quality of the shared infrastructure may reinforce the adoption of pumps
and over-appropriation of the groundwater resource (Wade, 1989). The institutions required
for addressing negative externalities caused by the interaction between different types of in-
frastructures is not well understood.
In this study, I develop a stylized replicator dynamic model to examine how price-based
interventions may improve the overall productivity and equity between upstream and down-
stream communities in an irrigation system with both shared and private infrastructures and
an asymmetric distribution of irrigation water. I contextualize the model predictions using the
case study of tank irrigation systems in South India. The two primary economic instruments
often used in irrigation management are water markets and water fees (Johansson et al., 2002).
The difference between these two instruments is in their implementation.
Water fees, such as volumetric and non-volumetric pricing, require the presence of a central
agency, such as a water user association, to set the price of water, monitor water use, and collect
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the fees (Wade, 1989; Tsur and Dinar, 1997). Water markets, on the other hand, provide more
flexibility in setting the price of irrigation water based on scarcity, and have been proven to
eliminate water allocation inefficiencies in systems where there is no central authority or the
central authority fails to respond to changingwater demands (Shah and Zilberman, 1991; Easter
et al., 1999). However, for water markets to work, there needs to be an irrigation agency, such
as the state, which defines tradable water rights, enforces property rights, and resolve potential
disputes among farmers (Zilberman et al., 1997).
I focus on water fee instruments in the study for three reasons. First, it is well-known that
policy instruments, such as volumetric pricing of water, may serve as signals for scarce re-
sources and induce farmers to change their appropriation and provision decisions accordingly
(Ostrom et al., 1994; Dinar and Mody, 2004; Tsur, 2005; Johansson et al., 2002). Second, in
the systems that I examine, there is often a water user association, which makes the implemen-
tation of these instruments feasible. Third, water markets may be less relevant because in the
absence of other fees, they will tend to gravitate towards a single price instrument for water
and ration water scarcity within the catchment. However, they don’t address provisioning of
shared infrastructure, , making them a panacea incapable of handling all the dilemmas in the
system.
In this study, I examine three important challenges: (i) the provision dilemma associated
with tanks, which is exacerbated by the presence of private groundwater pumps, (ii) the over-ap-
propriation of the groundwater, which may be reinforced by the provisioning dilemma, and
(iii) the negative externality caused by the withdrawal of water by upstream communities on
the productive use of tank water by downstream communities.
In systems that face multiple challenges, it is usually not feasible to achieve an efficient
outcome using a single policy instrument (Tinbergen, 1952). I postulate that the overall pro-
ductivity and distributional outcomes at system equilibrium may be improved with the use of
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multiple instruments compared to the use of a single policy instrument. Specifically, I exam-
ine three types of instruments: (i) a volumetric fee on tank users, which may be differentiated
based on their location; (ii) a volumetric fee on groundwater users; and (iii) a fixed fee on
groundwater users.
Three conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the analysis shows that in the absence
of rules for provision of shared infrastructure, the presence of a private infrastructure, like a
groundwater pump, to access a common-pool resource is an unmitigated bad and can push
farmers into a poverty trap. Second, the model results suggest that by using multiple price
instruments, we may not only improve total system productivity, but also improve equality in
the system. Specifically, the results show that a differentiated fee on tank users and a fixed
fee on groundwater users play a key role in addressing both the provisioning and water alloca-
tion challenges. The differentiated volumetric fees for tank users help mitigate the externality
caused by the upstream users due to their position. The fixed water fee reduces the number
of groundwater users in the system and disincentivizes groundwater pumping on the extensive
margin. This fee also helps mitigate water scarcity through improving the condition of the tank
infrastructure.
2.2 Empirical Background
Tanks, or surface reservoirs, are human-constructed earthen structures that capture rainfall and
surface run-off, and are the most important sources for irrigation in the southern states of India
dating as far back as 300 BC (Rangarajan, 1992; Mosse, 2006). Tank irrigation accounts for
about 55 percent of the total irrigated area in the state of Andhra Pradesh in South India and ap-
proximately 25 percent of the total rice production in India (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2010). They
usually range in sizes from 20 to 1,000 hectares. Water from the tank is distributed to agri-
cultural fields in the command area by gravity flow, through a variable number of sluices and
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canals. Collective maintenance of the shared tank and related physical structures is, therefore,
critical for the infrastructure to remain functional.
The share of tank-irrigated area in Andhra Pradesh declined by around 30 percent between
1990-1991 and 2000-2001, and many tanks are now physically in disrepair (Palanisami, 2006).
The reasons for the decline of tanks are complex and historically specific. These include colo-
nial tax systems, deforestation, land use change, intensified cropping patterns, encroachment
of tank beds, and siltation (Mosse, 1999). Adequate examination of all these reasons is well
beyond the scope of this paper. However, a particularly prominent diagnosis of these systems
has long been that individualized water control through adoption of private infrastructure, such
as groundwater pumps, has impinged upon the functioning of tank systems.
Provision andmaintenance of tanks, in the form of labor or money, often requires collective
action among farmers. On the other hand, farmers may access shared groundwater through
privately installed pumps that do not require collective action. Farmers using groundwater
irrigation, often, do not contribute towards the maintenance of tanks (Meinzen-Dick, 1984).
Reduced maintenance leads to excessive siltation and decline in performance of the shared
infrastructure, thereby incentivizing more farmers to shift to groundwater irrigation.
To make matters worse, access to tank water may be further diminished in systems with
an upstream-downstream asymmetry to water distribution. The size of tanks is often deter-
mined based on the water requirement of crops and the number of farms in their command
area, and they are designed to meet the water requirements of both upstream and downstream
farmers. However, when siltation makes water availability scarce, upstream farmers, by virtue
of their location, may over-appropriate in the absence of effective rules for coordination (Wade,
1989). This results in an inefficient distribution of the tank water to the downstream farmers
and pushing them to adopt groundwater technology.
In such systems, an engineering solution in the form of expanding the size of tanks is not
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feasible due to constraints on land availability and the high fixed costs involved in building
new infrastructure. Moreover, in the absence of rules that prevent upstream farmers from over-
appropriation, simply increasing the size of the tank may not guarantee more water availability
to downstream users (Wade, 1989).
The fact that groundwater can play an important role as a buffer against water scarcity
needs no elaboration. It has been well documented that agriculture productivity in systems
with groundwater irrigation are generally higher than those with surface water irrigation in
India (Shah, 2010). Furthermore, strong arguments have been made that access to groundwater
plays a critical role in poverty alleviation in India (Kerr, 2002; Dubash et al., 2002).
One problem, however, with groundwater is that access is not uniformly distributed. A
major share, about 40 percent, of the tank irrigated area in South India is accounted by small-
holder farmers (less than 2 hectares) (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2010). Since these farmers are
mostly poor, they often cannot afford cost-intensive irrigation technologies, such as groundwa-
ter pumps. Even in cases where farmers are able to access the technology through government
subsidies, the benefits of groundwater tend to disproportionately favor the early adopters, who
are typically wealthy farmers. As aquifer levels decline, the fixed costs of drilling the wells and
the variable pumping costs increase. Early adopters of the technology often accumulate suffi-
cient capital to diversify their incomes or to be able to deepen their wells as the aquifer level
declines. Considering the irreversible nature of the high initial investments made by farmers in
groundwater technology, later adopters are locked into the technology and risk being pushed
into a chronic poverty trap (Barrett and Swallow, 2006; Janakarajan and Moench, 2006).
A large body of work in economics has analyzed the externalities of groundwater extraction
and offers clear prescriptions in the form of optimal policy instruments (Gisser and Sanchez,
1980; Burt, 1967; Smith et al., 2017). Much of this work examines optimal groundwater man-
agement through the lens of appropriation dilemmas caused by competitive patterns of water
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extraction. However, the competition for groundwater may be exacerbated by the provisioning
dilemma and locational asymmetry associated with a shared infrastructure, such as a tank. In
such cases, there may be a need for an integrated set of institutions to coordinate the infrastruc-
ture provision and water distribution processes.
2.3 Model Structure
To explore the interdependencies between the appropriation and provision dilemmas in an ir-
rigation system explicitly, I develop a model of farmers’ choice of infrastructure and their
appropriation decisions conditional on this choice. The model is loosely parameterized based
on data gathered from 40 focus group discussions and 80 interviews conducted in 10 irrigation
communities in the state of Andhra Pradesh in South India. I also draw upon the ethnographic
work of Mosse (2008, 1999), Palanisami (2006), and Meinzen-Dick (1984) on tank irrigation
systems in South India.
In the model, individual farmers have two strategies for irrigation: R andG. Rs rely on the
shared tank infrastructure to receive their irrigation water. Gs use private groundwater pumps
for irrigation. I examine how the strategies of farmers and the resource availability change
over time. For the remainder of the the discussion, I use the notation that subscripts refer to the
village and superscripts refer to the type of infrastructure the farmers rely upon for irrigation
water. For example, piR1 refers to the profit of tank users in the upstream village and piG1 refers
to the profit of groundwater users in the upstream village.
Consider N farming households spread across two villages (village 1 and village 2) that
manage a shared irrigation tank and access the groundwater aquifer through private ground-
water pumps (Figure 2). Tank users have an asymmetric access to the tank water, whereas
groundwater users in both villages access a shared aquifer.
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Shared Tank (Reservoir)
Village 1 Village 2
Groundwater Aquifer
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the system layout. Villages 1 and 2 have asymmetric
access to the tank water. Village 1 has an advantage over village 2 in receiving water from the
shared tank. Both villages have a symmetric access to the groundwater through private
pumps.
There are N1 and N2 households in each village, respectively, with N1 + N2 = N .1
Farmers may choose one of two irrigation technologies for water: the fraction of farmers who
rely on tank irrigation in village 1 and village 2 are X1 and X2 respectively. Conversely, the
fraction of farmers who rely on groundwater pumps in each village are (1−X1) and (1−X2).
I assume that farmers are endowed with the same acreage. This assumption is consistent
with my observations in Andhra Pradesh where a majority of farmers own small farms (2-4
acres). I also assume that sufficiently strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms exist in
the irrigation system, which ensure that all tank users contribute towards maintenance of the
1Lack of human capital, liquidity and other entry barriers to rural non-farm employment prevent migration
in these systems (Meinzen-Dick, 1984).
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shared infrastructure. I assume that the maintenance efforts are coordinated by an irrigation
agency, such as the Panchayat Samiti, or Regional IrrigationMinistry of Andhra Pradesh. This
agency may either be a farmer managed water user association or the state.
I assume that the tank infrastructure and groundwater aquifer are in pristine states initially,
i.e., the tank is at full capacity and the groundwater availability is at 100%. This assumption
mimics the initial conditions of the tank irrigation systems I examine. I also assume that a
small fraction (0.1%) of the populations in upstream and downstream villages are groundwater
users. This assumption is made to overcome the limitation of replicator dynamics in dealing
with strategy innovation in the system (Gintis, 2009).
2.3.1 Shared Infrastructure Dynamics
The function of the tank is to capture a monsoon’s worth of rain that flows into the system
and distribute water availability for the planting season. In the analysis, I assume that the area
of the tank remains fixed. Consequently, the amount of water that is available in the tank for
irrigation is equal to the capacity (or depth) of the tank. As the tank becomes more silted, its
capacity reduces and consequently, the water available for irrigation decreases.
Farmers must maintain the shared infrastructure each year through desilting and repair
works. If too few farmers contribute towards maintenance, the infrastructure is heavily silted
andwater availability is reduced. In themodel, I assume that there is always sufficient monsoon
flows to fill the tank, regardless of its capacity. This assumption allows me to treat the tank
capacity as analogous to the water available in the tank. I denote the capacity of the shared
infrastructure with R. The dynamics of R are assumed to be:
dR
dt
= θ
(M
R
)µ
− σR (2.1)
where R ≤ Rmax, M is the total maintenance revenue collected from farmers in villages 1
and 2, θ scales the marginal productivity of the maintenance investment, and σ is the natural
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rate of siltation of the tank. µ is a scaling parameter between 0 and 1, which relates how the
effect of maintenance and infrastructure capacity change across different levels of maintenance
investment.
The term
(
M
R
)µ
assumes a diminishing effect of maintenance on capacity of the infras-
tructure at the margin. That is, as more silt is removed and the depth of the tank increases,
more effort is required to remove an equal amount of silt because of biophysical factors, such
as water logging and soft sediment.
2.3.2 Resource Dynamics
The equation ofmotion for groundwater stock, derived from simplifiedmass-balance equations,
assumes the “bathtub” aquifer model (Provencher and Burt, 1993). I assume that dynamics of
the tank and aquifer are physically decoupled, i.e., there is no recharge of the aquifer from the
tank. The equation of motion describing the height of water table,G, in an underground aquifer
is:
dG
dt
=ρ− κ(N1(1−X1)g1 +N2(1−X2)g2) (2.2)
whereG ≤ the surface of the farmland, χ, ρ is the recharge to the basin, gi is the groundwater
appropriated by an individual farmer in village i, and κ is a parameter reflecting the influence
of a unit withdrawal on the water table height. This parameter will depend on the size, shape,
and porosity of the aquifer. In the model, I assume κ is equal to 1.
2.3.3 Benefit Components
An individual farmer’s profit flow is the outcome of an instantaneous optimization problem
in which the farmer chooses the amount of water they appropriate. I assume that all inputs,
including capital, are adjusted for a given amount of water or are fixed. Moreover, I assume
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that the prices of inputs and outputs are fixed. Under these assumptions, the quadratic seasonal
benefit accrued by a farmer in village i is:
BRi = βri − 0.5r2i (2.3)
BGi = βgi − 0.5g2i (2.4)
where ri is the quantity of tank water appropriated by an individual farmer in village i. The
intercept of the benefit functions, β, represents the monetary value of the additional output
generated by the first unit of irrigation water.
The first derivative of equations 2.3 and 2.4 allows me to solve for the factor demand
for water under all the aforementioned assumptions. This demand curve has a negative slope,
an assumption common in previous studies of irrigation water use (Khan and Young, 1979;
Howe et al., 1990). This assumption implies that the marginal benefit diminishes as a function
of the supply of irrigation water to farmers. The diminishing function occurs because of the
biological response of crops to water (Small and Carruthers, 1991). To simplify the analysis, I
also assume that the connectivity between the soil and groundwater salinization is negligible.
This assumption allows me to define similar benefit functions for tank and groundwater users.
2.3.4 Cost Components
The marginal fee paid by a tank user towards the maintenance of the shared infrastructure in
village i is assumed to be α. I assume that the cost of pumping water out of irrigation canals
for a tank user is negligible. Therefore, the total cost for a tank user in village i is proportional
to their water usage and is given by: αri.
The price instrument I envisioned for groundwater users is a unit fee, γ, which is charged
per unit of groundwater extracted. Therefore, the total cost for a groundwater user in village
i is: γgi. The revenue generated from this fee will go towards the maintenance of the tank. I
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observed that in nine out of the ten study sites, γ is equal to zero. This is also consistent with
the several other irrigation communities in South India (Meinzen-Dick, 1984). However, there
are a few cases, such as the Pani Panchayat system, where groundwater users pay a marginal
fee on groundwater use (Keremane et al., 2006). The revenue generated from this fee is spent
on provision of the shared tank.
Furthermore, the cost of pumping to a groundwater user depends on both the quantity of
water pumped to surface and the height of the water table. Cost is increasing in depth of water
and in total water pumped. The marginal cost of pumping water from the aquifer to the surface
is assumed to be a linear function of the lift of pump, (χ−G). The total cost for a groundwater
user in village i is equivalent to:
ci(G) = τ(χ−G)gi + γgi (2.5)
where χ is the surface of the farmland (inm),G is the height of the water table (inm), and τ is
the cost of pumping a unit of water (1m3) to a unit height ((1m). τ depends on the efficiency
of the pump and energy price.
2.3.5 Profit Functions
Individual farmers choose the amount of water to appropriate that maximizes their profits. The
profits of tank users in both villages may be summarized as:
piR1 (R,X1) = max
r1
βr1 − 0.5r21 − αr1 (2.6)
s.t. 0 ≤ r1 ≤ R
N1X1
(2.7)
piR2 (R,X1, X2) = max
r2
βr2 − 0.5r22 − αr2 (2.8)
s.t. 0 ≤ r2 ≤ R−N1X1r1
N2X2
(2.9)
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The constraints in the equations 2.7 and 2.9 demonstrate that during water scarcity, i.e., when
the water available is less than their unconstrained optimum, the upstream farmers consume
the available water in the tank and downstream farmers do not receive any water from the tank.
This reflects the asymmetry in distribution of tank water to downstream farmers. I also assume
that during water scarcity, water is distributed equally among tank users within the upstream
village.
The profits of groundwater users are equivalent to:
piGi (G,X1, X2) = max
gi
βgi − 0.5g2i − ci(G)gi (2.10)
s.t. 0 ≤ gi ≤ G
κ(N1(1−X1) +N2(1−X2)) (2.11)
The constraint in equation 2.11 implies that when the groundwater available is less than the
unconstrained optimum, the upstream and downstream farmers share the groundwater equally.
This represents the competition over groundwater resources between upstream and downstream
farmers. That is, water pumped by farmers in village 1 affects the availability of groundwater
for farmers in village 1 and vice-versa. I also assume that water is shared equally among
groundwater users within each village.
To maximize the total agricultural income, farmers should choose the amount of water to
appropriate, which may be derived by solving equations 2.6, 2.8, and 2.10:
dpiji
dxi
= 0 (2.12)
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where j = {R,G}. Solving equation 2.12 results in:
r∗1(R,X1) = min
(
β − α1, R
N1X1
)
(2.13)
r∗2(R,X1, X2) = min
(
β − α2, R−N1X1r
∗
1
N2X2
)
(2.14)
g∗1(G,X1, X2) = min
(
β − c1(G), G
κ(N1(1−X1) +N2(1−X2)
)
(2.15)
g∗2(G,X1, X2) = min
(
β − c2(G), G
κ(N1(1−X1) +N2(1−X2)
)
(2.16)
Given the choice of water appropriated by individuals, the aggregate maintenance revenue
collected in the system is:
M(X1, X2) = α[N1X1r1(R,X1) +N2X2r2(R,X2)]
+ γ[N1(1−X1)g1(G,X1, X2) +N2(1−X2)g2(G,X1, X2)] (2.17)
2.3.6 Decision Making
I develop a replicator dynamic model in order to understand the conditions under which farm-
ers decide to appropriate water from the tank and contribute to its maintenance versus engage
in groundwater extraction. Replicator dynamics model how individuals change their strate-
gies over time based on comparison of payoffs of tank and groundwater users in both villages
(Cressman and Tao, 2014).
The underlying assumption of replicator equations is that strategies with higher payoffs do
better and therefore, the frequency of a strategy changes at a rate equal to the difference between
its expected payoff and the average payoff of the population. Replicator dynamics also make a
plausible assumption that individualsmake decisions based on limited and localized knowledge
concerning the system (Gintis, 2009). The replicator equations track the fraction of tank users,
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Xi, in each village and may be summarized as:
dX1
dt
= φX1(pi
R
1 − pi1) (2.18)
dX2
dt
= φX2(pi
R
2 − pi2) (2.19)
where φ represents factors, such as fixed costs of switching strategies, problems of credit avail-
ability, and learning spillover effect, that may inhibit or enhance individual adoption and ex-
perimentation with profitable technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). piRi is the payoff
to a tank user in village i. pii the average payoff of a farmer in village i and is calculated as
pii = Xipi
R
i + (1−Xi)piGi .
2.4 Analysis and Discussion
Before I turn to the analysis, let me recall that I am analyzing the following system of four
differential equations:
dR
dt
= θ
(M
R
)µ
− σR
dG
dt
= ρ− κ(N1(1−X1)g1 +N2(1−X2)g2)
dX1
dt
= φX1(pi
R
1 − pi1)
dX2
dt
= φX2(pi
R
2 − pi2)
with all terms and functions defined in the Table 1. I focus on three key challenges in the
analysis. To reiterate the earlier discussion, the system faces three challenges: (i) the dilemma
of adequately funding the shared tank, (ii) the dilemma of efficient rationing of water between
upstream and downstream users when upstream users have priority of physical access, and
(iii) the over-appropriation dilemma for the groundwater aquifer.
The theory of second best states that if the Pareto optimum in a system cannot be achieved
due to multiple challenges, then addressing only one of the challenges may not result in a
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Table 1. Definitions of State Variables and Parameters
Symbol Definition
Dynamical and decision variables
R Capacity of the shared infrastructure
G Height of water table
Xi Fraction of shared infrastructure users in village i
piRi Payoff of shared infrastructure user in village i
piGi Payoff of groundwater user in village i
t Time
Parameters
θ Marginal productivity of the maintenance investment
µ Scaling parameter
σ Natural siltation rate of the tank
ρ Replenishing rate of the groundwater resource
β Marginal benefit of water
αi Marginal fee paid by tank users in village i
γ Marginal fee paid by groundwater users
ψ Fixed fee paid by groundwater users
τ Marginal cost of pumping water
ξ Surface of the farmland
φ Responsiveness of individuals to economic payoffs
welfare improvement (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). For instance, using a single well-crafted
policy instrument, such as a volumetric fee, may improve the provision of the tank (Meinzen-
Dick, 1984). However, such a fee increase costs and may reduce profitability and drive the
adoption of the non-taxed, private groundwater pumps, resulting in exhaustion of the ground-
water aquifer. In such cases, the interaction effect of these challenges must be considered to
achieve a relatively efficient outcome. Such an outcome, by definition, is a second-best opti-
mum.
While it may still be worthwhile to target the single challenge, understanding the multiple
challenges facing the system is critical for setting the optimum second-best fee for the single
instrument. In a second-best world, multiple policy instruments may be necessary to achieve
an efficient outcome. As it turns out, in general, there must be at least one policy instrument
for each policy target (Tinbergen, 1952).
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I consider three instruments in the analysis and focus on the behavioral responses of farm-
ers to each combination of instruments: (i) volumetric fee on tank users, which is differentiated
based on their location (DP), (ii) the differentiated tank fees plus a volumetric fee on ground-
water users (IM), and (iii) the preexisting instruments plus a fixed fee on groundwater users
at the extensive margin (EM). In the next few sections, I will discuss the relevance of each
instrument and their effect on the decisions of farmers.
Last, I will examine the effect of the price instruments based on the assumption that the rev-
enue generated through fees is fully reinvested in the maintenance of the shared infrastructure.
This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence, which shows that water user associa-
tions that levy the fees do not typically have the authority to use the revenue from fees beyond
the confines of the irrigation district (Meinzen-Dick, 1984).
2.4.1 Grid Search Optimization
I begin the analysis by first calculating the optimum time-invariant values of each instrument
that maximizes the total profit when the system reaches equilibrium.2 For this, I use a grid
search optimization algorithm, which is explained below. Then, using the optimal values, I
examine the effect of the instruments on system productivity and equity.
The grid search method is a “hyper-parameter search algorithm” that utilizes an objective
function to perform a nonlinear optimization (Ruud et al., 2000). It involves setting up a grid
with suitable spacing, evaluating the objective function at all the points in the grid, and identify-
ing the grid point corresponding to the maximum value of the function. In the model, I use this
method to search through a range of possible values for each of the instruments and identified
the values for which the system productivity (total profit) is maximum at equilibrium. I run the
2I do not examine the optimal approach path because in the “real-world”, rigid policies make it excessively
costly to implement feedback-control rules that optimize fees adaptively based on changing infrastructure condi-
tion and resource availability.
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grid search algorithm each time I introduce a new instrument in order to reevaluate the existing
policy instruments and iteratively search for the optimum.
2.4.2 Profit Normalization and Model Calibration
In order to compare the profits across the different instruments, I rescaled the profits in villages
1 and 2 between 0 and 1, using the min-max normalization method, where the minimum profit
that an individual can make in the system is zero. Maximum profit is obtained in the system
when individuals are economically unconstrained, without the volumetric fees. This may be
given by: pimax = 0.5β2. I calculated the total system productivity by summing across the
rescaled individual profits.
I calibrated the model using both interview data and existing literature. I deduced the rate
of depreciation for the tank infrastructure from the interview questionnaire on changes in the
size of the tank over the past 10-15 years. Then, I verified the results with existing literature
on the biophysical properties of tanks in South India (Shah and Raju, 2002; Jayatilaka et al.,
2003). I calibrated the parameter values for groundwater recharge and unit cost of pumping
using existing groundwater research in South India (Anuraga et al., 2006; Reddy et al., 2009;
Reddy, 2005). The parameter value in the production functions, namely the marginal benefit of
water, was derived based on the interview questions on farmers’ income as well as the literature
(Sakurai and Palanisami, 2001; Anbumozhi et al., 2001). The full set of parameter values along
with the model code is provided in the Appendix.
2.4.3 Collapse of Tank Irrigation Systems in South India
In several irrigation systems where tanks are centrally-constructed and shared structures, if the
upstream farmers ignore the scarcity that they generate for those lower in the system, then they
get most of the water. Farmers at the upstream may even maintain the shared infrastructure
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by themselves, such that only they receive sufficient water for irrigation (Palanisami, 2006).
Consequently, those at the downstream have even less reason contribute to the continual main-
tenance of the tank. Indeed, these considerations suggest that downstream farmers have the
greatest incentives to leave the current state and seek out a new system in the form of ground-
water irrigation. In order to replicate these observations frommy field work, themodel includes
a volumetric fee, α, only on the tank users in this part of the analysis.
I first identified the value of α for which the total profit is maximum. For this, I created
a row vector of 1,000 uniformly spaced points in the interval [0,1] and ran the grid-search
algorithm. Figure 3 shows the results of the grid-search algorithm.
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Figure 3. The graph shows the results of the grid search optimization at system equilibrium.
The X-axis represents the type of price intervention and the Y-axis shows the value of price
instrument at system equilibrium. α is the marginal appropriation fee paid by tank users
under No Intervention. α1 and α2 are the marginal fees paid by upstream and downstream
tank users. γ is marginal groundwater pumping fee. ψ is the fixed groundwater fee.
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Figures 4 and 5 show the capacity of the tank and groundwater availability in the system
respectively. When the system is at equilibrium, the capacity of the shared tank is at roughly
65 percent. Since the water available in the tank is less than the unconstrained optimum of
the upstream users (Figure 7), they consume all the available water. Therefore, all the down-
stream farmers shift to groundwater resources (Figure 8), resulting in over-extraction of the
groundwater resources. In the absence of groundwater pumping fees, groundwater availability
is reduced to 1.25% when the system reaches equilibrium (Figure 5).
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Figure 4. The graph show the results for the four price interventions: (i) No Intervention
(solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange
line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users
pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the
differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM
(long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding instruments, groundwater
users pay a fixed fee, ψ.. The X-axis is time and the Y-axis shows the capacity of the shared
tank in percentage.
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Figure 5. The graph show the results for the four price interventions: (i) No Intervention
(solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange
line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users
pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the
differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM
(long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding instruments, groundwater
users pay a fixed fee, ψ. The X-axis is time and the Y-axis shows the groundwater available
in the aquifer in percentage.
Figure 6 shows the normalized profits in villages 1 and 2, and overall system performance.
In the absence of rules that offset the distributional advantage of the upstream farmers, the
system’s profits are concentrated within upstream farmers (Figure 6). Downstream farmers
receive only 1.4% of the total benefits from irrigation because of the poor condition of shared
infrastructure and depletion of groundwater resources. This is the case even when the level
of the infrastructure fee is optimized to maximize total system profits. The single policy in-
strument of an undifferentiated fee on tank water use cannot secure sufficient tank capacity to
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supply water to downstream users without inducing their exit from the system to groundwater
due to the strategic appropriation advantage of upstream users.
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Figure 6. The graph shows the profits of upstream and downstream profits when the system
reaches equilibrium. The X-axis shows different price interventions: (i) No Intervention
(solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange
line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users
pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the
differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM
(long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding instruments, groundwater
users pay a fixed fee, ψ. The Y-axis represents the normalized profits.
This result is consistent with empirical observations that downstream farmers are often
pushed into poverty traps because of poor maintenance of the shared tank and exhaustion of
groundwater resources (Meinzen-Dick, 1984). What is striking about this result is that an
examination of case studies of irrigation systems in India, Nepal, and Indonesia shows that
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Figure 7. The graph shows appropriation decisions of upstream tank users for different price
interventions: (i) No Intervention (solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal
fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee,
α1 and downstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this
scenario, in addition to the differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal
fee, γ; and (iv) EM (long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding
instruments, groundwater users pay a fixed fee, ψ. The X-axis represents time. The Y-axis
represents the individual tank water intake by upstream farmers.
in the absence of coordination rules for provision of the shared infrastructure, presence of a
private infrastructure may reinforce locational asymmetries in a system (Ostrom and Gardner,
1993; Wade, 1989; Bastakoti et al., 2010).
2.4.4 Differentiated Fee (DP)
The withdrawal of tank water by the upstream farmers creates an externality due to their posi-
tion. Their withdrawal may prevent productive use of the tank water by downstream farmers.
The limitation of using a single instrument for both upstream and downstream users is that if
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Figure 8. The graph shows the fraction of tank users in upstream and downstream villages at
system equilibrium. The X-axis shows different price interventions.: (i) No Intervention
(solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange
line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users
pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the
differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM
(long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding instruments, groundwater
users pay a fixed fee, ψ.
the fee is low, the capacity of the tank will be low, resulting in water scarcity. As a result, the
upstream farmers will consume all the tank water. If the fee is too high, the overall system
profitability is reduced in spite of better tank infrastructure, inducing exit to groundwater use.
Therefore, the optimum thing to do is to enforce a higher fee on the upstream users. I specify
differentiated marginal fees on the upstream and downstream tank users, which are given by
α1 and α2 respectively.
By levying two different taxes on the farmers, the profit function of tank users may be
rewritten as: piRi = βri − 0.5r2i − αiri, where αi is the volumetric tax paid by a shared
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infrastructure user in village i. I ran the grid search algorithm to calculate the optimal values
of the fees for upstream and downstream tank users. For this, I created a 2-D grid with 2,5000
uniformly spaced points in the interval [0,1]. Then, I identified the values of α1 and α2 for
which the system productivity is maximized. The results of the grid search algorithm show
that when upstream shared infrastructure users pay 5.13 percent more than the downstream
users, maximum total profit is attained (Figure 3). When compared to the earlier scenario, the
fees for upstream tank users increase by 15% and downstream tank users are subject to an
increase of 7%.
Figures 4 shows the improvement in tank capacity. Capacity of the shared infrastructure is
at 70 percent, marking a increase of 5 percent compared to the case of single fee on upstream
and downstream tank users. The increase in the tank capacity may be explained by an increase
in the fees for both upstream and downstream tank users. In spite of the increase in availability
of tank water, upstream users are appropriating less water compared to the previous scenario
because of higher fees (Figure 7). Consequently, the profits of upstream users are reduced by
5.8% (Figure 6).
The combination of increased tank water availability and reduced appropriation by up-
stream users ensures that farmers at the downstream village receive more water (Figure 9).
The increase in availability of tank water for downstream farmers may also be observed in the
apparent increase in the fraction of tank users in the downstream village, representing a 91%
increase in downstream farmers who use tank water for irrigation (Figure 8). Fewer down-
stream farmers are adopting groundwater technology and therefore, there is a 25% increase
in the groundwater availability (Figure 5). To the extent that improved water supply from the
tank reaches a greater number of downstream farmers, they experience a 10% increase in their
profits, increasing the system profit by 8.6% (Figure 6).
The analysis illustrates the effectiveness of a higher maintenance tax for upstream farmers.
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Figure 9. The graphs shows the appropriation decisions of downstream tank users for
different price interventions: (i) No Intervention (solid red line): in this scenario, tank users
pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay
a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple
dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the differentiated tank water fees, groundwater
users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM (long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition
to the preceding instruments, groundwater users pay a fixed fee, ψ.. The X-axis represents
time. The Y-axis represents the individual tank water intake by downstream farmers.
The interpretation of this result may be that, if farmers are willing to pay more for reliable
water supplies (Bell et al., 2014), and the taxes collected are invested in the maintenance of the
shared irrigation infrastructure, then the higher maintenance taxes on upstream farmers may
produce efficiency gains.
Empirical cases of differentiated fees are few and far between. However, such an instru-
ment would be consistent with extant literature, which concludes that different taxes for up-
stream and downstream farmers, based on both water allocated and appropriated, may lead to
gains in economic efficiency and improve equity in the overall system (Bell et al., 2016). Im-
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plementing such a fee, however, in an actual irrigation system might face opposition because
farmers’ willingness to pay a higher tax is often contingent upon the expected reliability of
water supply (Bell et al., 2014). If their higher contributions do not quickly yield improved
tank infrastructure and economic performance, then farmers are likely to oppose such pricing
interventions. Implementing a higher tax on upstream farmers may also face opposition from
those whose decisions are not guided solely by economic considerations. They may be also be
driven by social norms, moral concerns, and power asymmetries (Bowles, 2008; Smith, 2018).
For instance, a volumetric fee failed to reduce water appropriation in Netherlands because
elite farmers used political power to exempt themselves from paying the fee (Schuerhoff et al.,
2013).
2.4.5 Volumetric Groundwater Pumping Fee (IM)
One way to further improve the productivity of the downstream farmers is through creating
optimal appropriation incentives for groundwater users. This may be achieved through a vol-
umetric fee on the intensive margin of groundwater users,γ, in addition to the preexisting fee
on tank users. The additional revenue collected from this fee is used for maintenance of the
tank. This instrument is motivated by the Pani Pachayat institution in South India (Keremane
et al., 2006), where owners of groundwater pumps also contribute towards maintenance of the
shared irrigation infrastructure.
In order to calculate the optimal value of γ, I used the grid search algorithm. I created a 3-D
grid with 27,000 uniformly spaced points in the interval [0,1]. Then, I identified the values of
γ, α1, and α2 for which the total system profit is maximum (Figure 3). The results of the grid
search algorithm show that in the presence of groundwater pumping, the fee for upstream tank
users decreased by around 3%, whereas the fee for downstream tank users decreased by 20%
(Figure 3). The decrease in the fees results in the upstream tank users appropriating more water
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in the presence of its increased availability (Figure 7), increasing their profits by 3% (Figure
6). As a result of increased appropriation by upstream tank users, the downstream tank users
receive similar quantity of water compared to the DP instrument (Figure 9). However, the
profits of the downstream farmers increase by 9%, which may be attributed to the decrease in
their fees (Figure 6). The total system productivity marginally improves by 2.6% relative to
theDP instrument because of introducing the volumetric groundwater fee.
Figure 8 illustrates the fraction of farmers in both villages who rely on the tank system in
the presence of a volumetric tax on groundwater users. I observe that, once again, all upstream
farmers are tank users and 93% of downstream farmers have switched to groundwater irrigation.
The 2% increase in the fraction of tank users in the downstream village may be explained by
the increased level of tank capacity and a higher groundwater fee.
By introducing a groundwater fee, the total revenue towards the maintenance of the tank
increases, resulting in an increase of 11% increase in the capacity of the tank relative to the
DP instrument (Figure 4). The groundwater fee contributes to nearly 9% of the total revenue
collected for maintenance of the tank (Figure 10).
The groundwater fee also reduces the pumping (Figure 11) and increases the groundwater
availability to 81%, representing a 57% increase compared to the groundwater availability in
the previous scenario with the DP instrument (Figure 5). The reduction in groundwater ex-
traction along the intensive margin is also observed empirically in extant literature, which con-
cludes that policy interventions in the form of Pigouvian-type taxes may internalize pumping
externalities and promote sustainable extraction (Gleick, 2010; Edwards, 2016; Smith, 2018).
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Figure 10. The graph shows the contribution of each instrument towards maintenance when
the system reaches equilibrium. The Y-axis shows the percentage contribution of each
instrument towards maintenance. The X-axis shows the four price interventions. (i) No
Intervention (solid red line): in this scenario, tank users pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP
(dashed orange line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α1 and
downstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple dot-dash line): in this
scenario, in addition to the differentiated tank water fees, groundwater users pay a marginal
fee, γ; and (iv) EM (long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition to the preceding
instruments, groundwater users pay a fixed fee, ψ.
2.4.6 Fixed Groundwater Fee (EM)
The volumetric fees that create efficient appropriation incentives for tank and groundwater
systems may not sufficiently fund the infrastructure, leading to degradation of the tank and
the aquifer. This creates a need for additional funds to improve the capacity of the tank in-
frastructure. However, raising volumetric fees on tank users will force too many users to exit
to groundwater and raising groundwater pumping fees may price groundwater too dearly for
appropriation purposes. Moreover, raising groundwater fees may work against raising revenue
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Figure 11. The graph shows the pumping decisions of groundwater users over time for
different price interventions: (i) No Intervention (solid red line): in this scenario, tank users
pay a marginal fee: α; (ii)DP (dashed orange line): in this scenario, upstream tank users pay
a marginal fee, α1 and downstream tank users pay a marginal fee, α2; (iii) IM (purple
dot-dash line): in this scenario, in addition to the differentiated tank water fees, groundwater
users pay a marginal fee, γ; and (iv) EM (long-dash green line): in this scenario, in addition
to the preceding instruments, groundwater users pay a fixed fee, ψ. The X-axis represents
time. The Y-axis represents the individual groundwater intake by farmers.
for tank maintenance by reducing pumping demand. Therefore, I envision an additional instru-
ment, a fixed fee on groundwater users. This fee does not affect the marginal decision-making
regarding appropriation for both tank and groundwater users. It can, however, raise additional
funds along the extensive margin. Therefore, when combined with the IM price instrument,
I expect the fixed fee instrument (EM ) to reduce the number of groundwater pumps, while
simultaneously increasing the revenue for tank maintenance. The additional revenue collected
in the system is, again, invested in maintenance of the tank.
By levying a fixed fee on groundwater users, the profit function of a groundwater user
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in village i may be rewritten as: piGi = βgi − 0.5g2i − cigi − ψ, where ψ is the fixed fee.
Once again, I ran the grid search algorithm to recalculate the optimal values of all the price
instruments. I created a 4-D grid with 390,625 uniformly spaced points in the interval [0,1].
Then, I identified the values of α1, α2, γ, and ψ for which the total profit is maximized.
The results of the grid search show that the optimal value of the fixed fee is nearly 22% of
the total system profits after deducting the fees (Figures 3 and 6). A 7% increase is observed in
the fees for upstream tank users, 28% reduction in fees for downstream tank users, and nearly
54% reduction in groundwater pumping fee. The combination of the EM instrument and a
higher fee on upstream tank users increases the tank capacity by nearly 7.5% (Figure 4). The
increase in the tank capacity means that the upstream tank users can meet their unconstrained
optimum, which is now lower compared to the previous scenario due to the higher fee on
upstream tank users (Figure 7). The higher fee on upstream tank users ensures there is more
water available for the downstream tank users (Figure 9). The fixed fee partially blocks exit
to the groundwater system and makes it possible to raise upstream fees to these levels, thus
addressing the upstream-downstream externality. Consequently, the number of tank users in the
downstream village increased by 3% compared to the previous treatment (Figure 8). Moreover,
the reduction in the groundwater fee results in higher rates of pumping (Figure 11), but the fixed
fee results in fewer groundwater users (Figure 8), resulting in an overall improvement in the
groundwater aquifer (Figure 5).
The economic performance increases significantly by nearly 18% and equality among both
villages improves as well (Figure 6). This result suggests that that the groundwater fixed fee
is an important part of improving the overall economic performance as well as equality. Re-
solving the water allocation problem among upstream and downstream users is usually viewed
entirely as a matter of water pricing (David et al., 2015). However, the fees that disincen-
tivize high water use by upstream users may also drive them out of the system, especially
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when groundwater is under-priced, which further exacerbates the water scarcity. On the other
hand, the volumetric fees that disincentivize high groundwater pumping may reduce the pump-
ing demand, and consequently the provision of the tank infrastructure. This tension between
addressing provisioning and appropriation dilemmas through the same instrument limits the
performance of volumetric fees alone. The fixed charge takes the pressure off the volumetric
fees to address the provisioning dilemma. The improved equality of upstream and downstream
users in Figure 6 shows that differentiated water pricing on tank users is now largely playing
an allocative role, and the fixed fee is addressing the provisioning challenge. Figure 10 shows
that the fixed fee contributes to nearly 3% of the maintenance revenue collected in the system.
A price instrument on the extensive margin of groundwater users may be relevant in the
South Indian context. Between 2002-2012, groundwater declined at an average rate of 1.4
meters per year in the southern states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in India (Chinnasamy
and Agoramoorthy, 2015). It was found that groundwater usage was nearly 8 percent more
than the annual recharge rates in both these states. A key characteristic of the two states is
that groundwater technology is subsidized by the state governments through provision of low-
interest loans and subsidized electricity. Low adoption and operational costs resulted in a rapid
expansion of groundwater irrigation and excessive pumping rates (Dubash, 2007). Therefore,
one way to reduce groundwater use is to increase the adoption costs of groundwater technology
so that fewer pumps are installed.
Designing a price instrument that reduces the number of groundwater pumps in the system
may also have positive consequences on collective-choice arrangements in the system. Given
the high, indivisible fixed costs associated with adopting groundwater technology, farmers
may organize collective action for low risk and regular activities, such as allocation of water
and maintenance of pumps (Aggarwal, 2007). However, such arrangements may frequently
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dissolve when confronted with pressures such as electricity shortages and the desire to shift
cropping patterns (Ghate, 1980).
2.4.7 Effect of Diminishing Returns of Maintenance on System Productivity
In the final part of the analysis, I examine the effect of diminishing returns of infrastructure
provision on the system productivity. There are two ways of redistributing the benefits of
maintenance revenue in a system. The first is to utilize the revenue solely for maintenance of
the shared infrastructure. Such revenue redistribution may offset the marginal cost of resource
appropriation and also, lower the overall cost of public good provision (Oates and Schwab,
1988). The second mechanism is to spend only a fraction of the tax revenue for maintenance
of the shared tank. The remaining amount may be redistributed in the system through other
mechanisms, such as dividends to farmers (Tsur and Dinar, 1997). Given the assumption of
diminishing returns of maintenance investments, there is a risk of over allocating resources for
provisioning of the tank infrastructure. Hence, it is important to consider how to redistribute
the benefits of the revenue generated from the price instruments.
This possibility is investigated by comparing the system productivity under different levels
of the revenue from fees (60%,70%,80%, 90%, and 100%) spent for maintenance of the shared
infrastructure. I used the optimal instrument values of the EM intervention for this analysis
because it yielded the highest productivity in the preceding analysis. For the cases where only
a fraction of the tax revenue (60%,70%,80%, 90%) is spent on maintenance, the remainder
maintenance revenue is added to the total profit as a lump-sum benefit. Then, the total profit
is normalized using the min-max normalization method described earlier.
Figure 12 shows the profits under different levels of revenue spent on maintenance of the
shared infrastructure. As the fraction of maintenance revenue spent on the tank infrastructure
is increased, the total profits increase at a decreasing rate. Moreover, when only 90% of the
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maintenance revenue is spent on maintenance of the shared infrastructure, system productivity
is similar to the scenario where the full revenue is spent for maintenance of the tank (Figure
12). This result suggests that due to diminishing returns of investments on tank maintenance,
more investments cease to provide any significant benefits in system productivity after a certain
point, and is likely to result in “over-provision” of the shared infrastructure. Instead, it may
be more efficient to consider alternative mechanisms, such as water dividends to farmers, to
redistribute some of the benefits of the fees, while still providing the marginal incentive effects
of water pricing and the groundwater fixed charge. A key consideration here is that these lump-
sum benefits must be designed such that they are behaviorally neutral and are likely to increase
the household income, but do not skew appropriation incentives at the margin.
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Figure 12. The graph shows the normalized profits of upstream and downstream villages at
system equilibrium for different fractions of maintenance revenue investment. The results
reported here are for the EM instrument, in which tank users pay a differentiated water fee
and groundwater users pay a fixed fee in addition to the marginal pumping fee.
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2.5 Conclusion
The use of human-constructed, shared infrastructure to access natural resources has been a
central feature of modern societies for centuries. Provision of shared infrastructure for contin-
ual delivery of resources is one of the key sustainability challenges we face currently. There
are several factors that affect the provision of shared infrastructures. One key factor that has
received relatively little attention in existing literature is the role of private infrastructure.
The relationship between private goods and provision of public goods has been widely ex-
amined in the economics literature. It has been suggested that private goods will likely improve
the provision of public goods, which are supplied by a monopolistic state agency (Pecorino,
2008; Cornes and Sandler, 1989; Vicary, 2004). On the other hand, presence of private infras-
tructure is also likely to worsen the provision of public goods in the context of scarce resources
(Cárdenas et al., 2017). Though much has been written about the relationship between pub-
lic and private goods in different social-ecological systems (irrigation, transportation, energy,
knowledge commons), there has been relatively little work on what types of policy interven-
tions are required to improve the provision of public goods. I examined this problem in the
context of tank irrigation systems in South India.
I developed a stylized replicator dynamic model to demonstrate that in the absence of ap-
propriate institutions, access to groundwater resources through private groundwater pumps is
an unmitigated bad because it not only contributes to the decline of shared irrigation infrastruc-
ture, but also contributes to the chronic poverty of downstream farmers. The results suggest
that we require multiple price instruments to not only improve the economic efficiency of the
system, but achieve this without compromising on the equity within the system.
The effectiveness of price-based interventions depends on the institutional context of the
irrigation system. For instance, volumetric pricing methods typically require information on
the quantity of water used by an individual farmer. Collecting such information entails high
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transaction costs because it requires water meters, periodic water usage readings, and regular
maintenance of the meters. Also, in the absence of water markets, a central authority, such
as the state or a water user association, is required to set the pumping fee (Tsur and Dinar,
1997). In irrigation systems that lack the institutional capacity to enforce and monitor, efforts
to implement a volumetric pricing mechanism to conserve water may be unsuccessful (Yang
et al., 2003).
The key result of the model is regarding the importance of the fixed groundwater fee in ad-
dressing the provisioning dilemma concerning the shared infrastructure. Given the challenges
with monitoring the volumetric fee for groundwater pumping, We may envision an institution,
where we retain the differentiated volumetric fees for tank water and enforce the fixed ground-
water fee. Under such an institution, over-extraction of groundwater is discouraged on the
extensive margin, and doesn’t affect marginal decision-making with respect to appropriation
for both tank and well users. However, it helps mitigate the problem of water scarcity by im-
proving the infrastructure condition, thereby reducing the importance of volumetric pumping
fee.
I must note that the model’s simplified features render it only illustrative of the more com-
plex set of choices that farmers actually confront and is not intended to replicate any particular
geographic region. For example, I treat farmers’ infrastructure choices as binary, whereas a
more realistic rendering would be to treat them as continuous and allow for conjunctive use
of the two infrastructures. It is, however, worth noting that the model permits an intuitive pic-
ture of the central provisioning and appropriation dilemmas that farmers face, and the results
are consistent with some notable cases of irrigation systems in the extant literature. I extend
the literature by considering how different price instruments can create different incentives
for farmers using heterogeneous irrigation infrastructures. The results can help policymakers
assess the relative gains to different user groups under different instruments.
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Chapter 3
WATER AND ELITES: THE ROLE OF CULTURAL POLITICS IN IRRIGATION
DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Introduction
Maintaining a consistent supply of water is a key challenge faced by irrigation systems around
theworld. Empirical observations of social organization patterns demonstrate themanyways in
which societies have responded to this problem. Irrigators can invest in physical infrastructure
(storage facilities, etc.) to normalize resource variability (Anderies, 2015). Alternatively, they
might use a portfolio of water allocation rules that vary based on water availability (Cifdaloz
et al., 2010). Either approach requires political institutions to enforce the water allocation
and infrastructure provision rules. These political institutions, which are often an outcome
of the endogenous preferences of a society (Muneepeerakul and Anderies, 2017), are a key
determinant of economic performance in a society. (North, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Greif
et al., 1994; Greif, 2006; Wade, 1989).
To further understand the role of political institutions in the economic performance of ir-
rigation systems, this study addresses how the presence of power asymmetries perpetuated by
cultural norms, such as caste, affect the persistence of political institutions to provide shared in-
frastructure in an irrigation system. More specifically, I examine the effect of policy tools, such
as non-farm wage employment and informational interventions, on the persistence of these two
political institutions: self-governed and nested.
Two key perspectives concerning political institutions and economic performance of irri-
gation systems have developed in the literature. One suggests that community-managed in-
stitutions enable irrigation communities to foster local collective action and manage shared
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resources sustainably (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; McKean, 1992). Another
alternate institution that has received substantial focus in the literature is a nested institution,
in which the state partakes in creating local organizations (such as water user associations) to
allocate water and maintain the infrastructure (Ostrom, 1990; Baker, 2011).
Scholars within the CPR literature argue in favor of nesting local organizations within the
state over community-managed institutions because organizing multiple governing authorities
at different scales improves provisioning of public goods (Ostrom et al., 1961; Ostrom, 1990).
However, empirical work in India (Mosse, 2008; Baker, 2011) shows that in several irrigation
communities with substantial differences in social status and landholding size, high-caste farm-
ers (elites) have opposed state intervention through de facto political power, such as bribery
and violence.
In such systems, the person responsible for activities such water allocation, collection of
maintenance fees, and monitoring water thefts, typically, belongs a lower caste (Baker, 2011).
This prevents them from sanctioning high-caste farmers when they either over-appropriate irri-
gation water or do not contribute towards maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. Due to
greater expected returns in such self-governed regimes, elite farmers may oppose state interven-
tion (Baker, 2011; Kashwan, 2016). This is detrimental to poorer sections of the communities
(non-elites) because they do not have the resources required to petition for state intervention
and enforcement of legal rights.
I develop a compartmental model that tracks the institutional preferences of farmers in a
community-managed irrigation system with caste-based inequalities. The model results sug-
gest that critical regime shifts in political institutions can be generated by intervening in labor
market institutions. Such institutions reflect changes in payoffs from non-farm wage employ-
ment because of either exogenous market forces or government policy (minimum wage in-
creases).
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I found that by increasing non-farm wages to elite farmers, the system can flip from a
self-governance regime to a nested institution. However, this might not result in significant
improvements in the infrastructure efficiency. That is, even if the political institution even-
tually changes, because of the depreciation of irrigation infrastructure, the regime shift may
occur too late. Therefore, the approach path to the steady state, or the speed of the institu-
tional change, matters and must synchronize with the infrastructure dynamics. This result
complements North’s (1994) discussion on the importance of learning in changing individuals’
perceptions about their payoffs and institutional change in the long-run.
3.2 Model Structure
To explore the interdependencies between informal institutions, such as caste, the stability of
political institutions, and the state of provisioning of shared infrastructure, I develop a com-
partmental model of farmers’ institutional choice, which is conditional on their payoffs under
the formal institutions. The model is loosely parameterized based on the case-study work by
Baker (2011) in the community-managed Kuhl irrigation systems in North India.
In the model, farmers may choose between two political institutions: S and J . S is the
self-governance regime and J is the nested institution. The difference between these two po-
litical institutions is in their water allocation mechanism and maintenance fees, which will be
discussed below.
Consider N farming households are spread across one village that co-manage a single
canal irrigation system. There are two groups of farmers in the village,E and P , which satisfy
NE + NP = N . Es represent the elites (high-caste farmers) and P represent the poor (low-
caste farmers).
I assume that farmers have different “mental models” of which political institution is better.
Also, their choice of the political institution does not necessarily does not coincide with the
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institution that they actually lives under. It’s just a voting preference. I define the total number
of farmers who prefer Ss as NS = NE,S + NP,S . Consequently, the number of farmers who
prefer Js in the village are: NJ = NE,J + NP,J . For the remainder of my discussion, I use
the notation that the first term in the subscript refers to the farmer’s group and the second term
refers to their institutional choice.
3.2.1 Shared Infrastructure Dynamics
Irrigation infrastructure, such as canals and weirs, concentrates the availability of the irrigation
water for use. It requires an investment of time and effort to maintain its functionality. In my
model, I assume that under a self-governance institution, collection of fees and maintenance
efforts are coordinated by an individual, who is officially appointed by the farmers. This as-
sumption is based on examples of several irrigation systems in India, in which farmers elect a
person within their community to carry out maintenance works (Mollinga, 2001; Mosse, 1999;
Baker, 2011). I assume that under a nested regime, these activities are carried out by the state
through a local organization, such as a water user association. These assumptions are consistent
with the empirical observations of Baker (2011).
I denote the efficiency of the infrastructure with I . The dynamics of I is assumed to be:
dI
dt
= ν
(M(.)
I
)σ
− µI (3.1)
where M(.) is the maintenance function, which depends on the political institution of the
system as defined below. ν is the marginal productivity of the maintenance investment, and µ
is the natural rate of siltation of the tank. M(.)
The term
(
M(.)
I
)σ
in assumes a diminishing effect of maintenance on capacity of the irri-
gation infrastructure at the margin. That is, as more silt is removed, more effort is required to
remove an equal amount of silt because of biophysical factors, such as water logging and soft
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sediment. σ is a scaling parameter between 0 and 1, which relates how the effect of mainte-
nance on infrastructure capacity changes across different levels of maintenance investment.
I assume that there is constant source of irrigation water, Q, from which farmers can ap-
propriate. Therefore, the total irrigation water in the system is then given by R(I) = QI .
3.2.2 Payoffs
I assume that each individual is endowedwith a unit of household labor. An individual farmer’s
profit flow is the outcome of an instantaneous static optimization problem in which the indi-
vidual farmer allocates their household labor among two activities: farming (l) and non-farm
employment (1− l). I assume that both elites and poor farmers have the same production func-
tion, a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale, which depends on production
inputs: acreage (ai), farm labor (li) and water (ri).
I assume that the total available acreage in the command area is distributed between P and
E in the ratio λ
1+λ
and 1
1+λ
. So, the total acreage ofP ,AP , can be expressed in terms of acreage
of E, AE , as AP = λAE . Therefore, the individual-level acreage is given by: ai = Ai/Ni.
The individual shares in the available water supply are defined through the solution of a
bargaining game between elite and poor farmers. There is an asymmetry in the bargaining
position that is shaped by the political institution. I assume that the other privately supplied
production inputs and capital are optimized for a given amount of water. Under these assump-
tions, a farmer in group i will maximize their net incomes under either political institution,
given by:
pii,S(r(I)) = max
li,S
ρia
α
i l
β
i,S
(
ri,S(I)
)γ
+ wi(1− li,S)− ψri,S(I) (3.2)
pii,J(r(I)) = max
li,J
ρia
α
i l
β
i,J
(
ri,J(I)
)γ
+ wi(1− li,J)− θri,J(I) (3.3)
where i = {E,P}, ρi is the price per unit of production input, wi is the wage rate for non-
farm employment, ri,S(I) is the individual water share for a farmer in group i under the self-
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governance regime, and ri,J(I) is the individual water share of a farmer in group i under the
nested institution. ψ and θ are the marginal maintenance fees on water used under the self-
governance and nested institution respectively. α, β, and γ are the output elasticities of acreage,
labor, and water respectively, and α + β + γ = 1.
3.2.3 Water Allocation Mechanisms
Under the nested regime, I assume that the state assumes the role of a social planner and wants
to maximize system profits with a linear cost of supplying water. Therefore, they fully allocate
all the available water and split it evenly across all the farmers. This assumption is consistent
with several examples of public water allocation procedures (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997).
The individual water share of elite and poor farmers is then given as:
rE,J(I) = rP,J(I) =
R(I)
N
(3.4)
Under the self-governance regime, I assume a proportional water distribution model. That
is, water is distributed among farmers in the irrigation system on a per-acre basis. This assump-
tion is consistent with empirical observations by Baker (2011). In my model, I assume that the
total agricultural land in the command area is distributed between elite and poor farmers as 1
1+λ
and λ
1+λ
. Therefore, their respective individual shares of the irrigation water will be:
rE,S(I) =
R(I)
NE(1 + λ)
(3.5)
rP,S(I) =
λR(I)
NP (1 + λ)
(3.6)
3.2.4 Institutional Choice
I assume that the irrigation system reflects a democratic society where if there is sufficient
dissatisfaction with the current water allocation and management of the infrastructure, there
can be a referendum to switch the political institution. In order to track the institutional choice
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of individuals, I develop a compartmental model (Pulliam, 1988), which assumes that every
individual has a discrete preferred institutional choice or “mental model”. To recall, the two
political institutions are: self-governance (S) and nested (J). I, then, track how the elites and
poor farmers change their institutional choice over time.
Let XE and XP represent the fraction of elite and poor farmers, respectively, whose pref-
erence over governance is J . Then, the fraction of individuals whose preference is S may be
given by: (1 − Xi). I assume that farmers have bounded rationality, which refers to the fact
that they can make their decision based on limited information, in this case the infrastructure
efficiency and their payoffs under the two institutions. The dynamics ofXi may be given by:
dXi
dt
=

φi(1−Xi)
(
pii,J − pii,S
)
if pii,J > pii,S
φiXi
(
pii,J − pii,S
)
if pii,J < pii,S
The interpretation of the above equations is that if the profits from nested institution are
higher than the self-governance regime, then farmers will switch there preference over gov-
ernance to the nested institution. On the other hand, if the profits under the self-governance
regime are higher, then farmers will change their preference to self-governance.
φi represents the responsiveness of a farmer in group i to economic payoffs. This adjust-
ment parameter captures the notion that farmers’ mental models about their institutional choice
may also be influenced by non-pecuniary considerations, such as their cultural beliefs, lack of
education, control of information by elites, etc. (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
3.2.5 Institutional Change
The dynamical equations in section 3.2.4 represent the mental models of individual farmers. In
order for the political institution to actually change, a threshold majority condition, Γ, must be
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met. This represents institutional inertia in the system and is given by:
k(V (XE, XP )) =

1 if V (XE, XP ) ≥ Γ
0 otherwise
where k(.) = 1 indicates that the system has shifted to the nested regime and k(.) = 0 indi-
cates that the system persists in the self-governance regime. V (.) is the voting function that
determines the outcome of the voting process and is given by:
V (XE, XP ) = ΩEXE + ΩPXP (3.7)
where ΩE and ΩP are the voting weights of elite and poor farmers respectively, such that
ΩE + ΩP = 1. Baker (2011) illustrates that elite farmers possess de facto political power of
elites, which emerges from cultural norms, such as caste, and other channels such as lobbying
or bribery. In order to capture this, I assume that elites and poor farmers have differential voting
weights, such that ΩE > ΩP .
3.2.6 Maintenance Function
Themaintenance fee in the self-governance regime, θ, is assumed to be lower than the fee in the
nested regime, ψ. This assumption is based on empirical evidence that under nested regimes,
the maintenance fees are typically calibrated to acreage and higher than the fees under self-
governance regimes (Baker, 2011). The infrastructure maintenance function depends on the
political institution governing the system and is given by
M(.) =

Nθ if k(V (XE, XP )) = 1
Nψ if k(V (XE, XP )) = 0
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3.3 Discussion
The political institutions in my model affect the maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure,
which subsequently affects the payoffs of the farmers through the provisioning of water, which
increases profits monotonically, but with diminishing returns. Therefore, I focus my analysis
on the condition of the infrastructure in my analysis and treat this as an indicator of the perfor-
mance for a given political institution. I examine the effect of voting weights, non-farm labor
wages, and the rate of adjustment of the mental model on the regime shift and infrastructure
provision. Table 6 summarizes the definitions all the model parameters.
I assume that the system is under the self-governance regime initially. This assumption
mimics the initial conditions of several irrigation systems in India (Ostrom, 1990). I also as-
sume a simple majority rule for the voting threshold condition under which the political insti-
tution changes, i.e., Γ = 0.51.
In order to understand the institutional preferences of farmers, I conduct the analysis in
three parts. First, I examined how different voting weights, Ωi may lead to different steady
states represented by the two state variables, public infrastructure condition (I) and voting
outcome (V ). Second, I examined the role of non-farm wage employment of elites, wE , on
the condition of irrigation infrastructure, and the payoffs and voting preferences of elite and
poor farmers. Last, I examine the role of informational interventions on the payoffs and voting
preferences of elite and poor farmers. For this purpose, I focus on the rate of adjustment of the
mental model of poor farmers, φP .
3.3.1 Analysis I: Effect of Voting Weights
I characterized two voting rules (elitist and egalitarian) that affect the voting outcomes through
which the political institutions and the relative payoffs of farmers are determined. Using the
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parameters for voting weights in equation 3.7, I characterize elitist as ΩE = 0.6, ΩP = 0.4
and egalitarian as ΩE = 0.5, ΩP = 0.5.
At the outset, the payoffs to the elite farmers are greater under the self-governance institu-
tion than the nested institution. This is because elites receive more water and the maintenance
fee is lower under the self-governance regime. On the other hand, the payoffs to the poor
farmers are greater under the nested institution because of greater water allocation by the state.
Moreover, the provision of infrastructure is better under the nested regime due to higher main-
tenance fees, resulting in higher infrastructure efficiency (Figure 13). The model also predicts
that the poor farmers are more likely to choose the nested regime, while the elite farmers choose
the self-governance regime (Figure 14).
The actual change in the institution, however, occurs only when the majority threshold, Γ,
is met. When the voting weights of poor farmers are lower than the elite farmers, the threshold
is not met because the elites’ preference for the self-governance regime (Figure 14). On the
other hand, when the voting weights are equal, the threshold condition is met and the institution
changes to a nested regime. This result suggests that contrary to popular belief, self-governance
does not necessarily result in better infrastructure provision, especially in societies with high
power asymmetries among farmers.
The role of elites in determining the persistence of political institutions has also been ob-
served by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). This work, however, is at a macro level and focuses
on the role of elites in democratic and autocratic societies. The focus of my model is at a local
level, specifically on systems where livelihoods of people are tied to a shared resource. The
voting weights in my model represent the de facto political power of elites, which may be used
to shape the outcomes of a democratic voting process within a community. Such power may
be an outcome of a cultural norm, such as caste.
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Figure 13. This figure represents the dynamics of infrastructure depreciation over time for
two states of the world. The X-axis represents time and Y-axis shows infrastructure efficiency
in %. The blue line represents an elitist society (ΩE = 0.6, ΩP = 0.4) and the green line
represents an egalitarian society (ΩE = 0.5, ΩP = 0.5). The solid line indicates
self-governance regime and the dotted line indicates the nested regime.
For instance, farmers in the Ranjya Kuhl irrigation system in North India voted for the state
to take over management of the irrigation system. This would have been achieved by forming
a water user association to (i) facilitate the acquisition of government funds for infrastructure
repair and maintenance, and (ii) guarantee fair allocation of water to farmers. However, the
involvement of the state meant that the high-caste farmers could no longer maintain their au-
thority over water control, which was the main reason for elites to the state intervention and
overturn the results of the voting process through bribery and violence (Baker, 2011). On the
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Figure 14. This figure represents the institutional preferences of farmers at system
equilibrium for two states of the world. The X-axis represents the state of the world: elitist
society (ΩE = 0.6, ΩP = 0.4), and an egalitarian society (ΩE = 0.5, ΩP = 0.5). The Y-axis
shows the fraction of population that chooses the nested institution. The voting majority
threshold for the institution to change is Γ = 0.51.
other hand, in more egalitarian communities, such as the Bhagotla Kuhl irrigation system, vot-
ing outcomes directly reflect the institutional choices of individuals and state intervention can
be successful (Baker, 2011).
3.3.2 Analysis II: Effect of Non-Farm Wages
In Analysis I, we observed that the presence of de facto political power may result in the per-
sistence of an inferior political institution, represented by a lower efficiency of public infras-
tructure. Empowering poor farmers politically, through their voting weights, may be one way
for the system to shift to a nested institution and improving the infrastructure efficiency.
On the other hand, policy makers may suggest formal economic institutions to incentivize
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the elites to choose the nested institution. For example, the state may improve the non-farm
opportunities for the elite farmers. Such a reform can reduce their reliance on farm income,
thereby reduce their need for water control. To generate some useful knowledge about such
a reform, this section investigates the effect of non-farm wages to elites on infrastructure ef-
ficiency and institutional change. The results shown here are for an elitist state of the world.
Except for the focal parameter, wE , the parameter values used in this section are the same as
the preceding section. I characterize low wage as wE = 0.2 and high wage as wE = 0.8.
Similar to the earlier case, the payoffs to the elite farmers are higher in the self-governance
institution when non-farm wages are low. The reason for this is a higher water share and lower
maintenance fee under the self-governance institution. Therefore, the elite farmers choose the
self-governance institution. On the other hand, when non-farm wages to the elite farmers are
high, their labor allocation to non-farm employment increases. This reduces their farm labor
and profit share from farming. The combination of higher profits from non-farm labor and
better infrastructure provision under the nested regime results in a higher fraction of the elite
farmers choosing the nested institution (Figures 15 and 16). As a higher fraction elite farmers
choose nested institution, the majority threshold, Γ, is met (Figure 16) and the system shifts to
the nested regime (Figure 15).
The importance of rural non-farm employment has been extensively discussed in the devel-
opment economics literature (Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon et al., 2007). The general conclu-
sion from this literature is that not all households have equal access to non-farm employment
(Barrett et al., 2001). The differential access to non-farm employment can change the pattern
of dependence on irrigation water. That is, households with new economic opportunities are
less willing to engage in infrastructure maintenance, especially when the opportunity costs of
their labor are foregone cash wages (Cárdenas et al., 2017). On the other hand, households
with greater constraints to non-farm employments, typically poor households, face increased
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Figure 15. This figure represents the dynamics of infrastructure depreciation over time for for
two levels of non-farm wages to the elite farmers: low wage society (wE = 0.2), and high
wages (wE = 0.8). The X-axis represents time and Y-axis shows infrastructure efficiency in
%. The solid line indicates self-governance regime and the dotted line indicates the nested
regime.
burden to maintain the infrastructure. In such cases, state intervention can augment the infras-
tructure provision (Baker, 2011). Increasing non-farm opportunities can, however, increase
the risk of conflicts arising from caste-based inequalities because of reduced dependence on
the benefits of the shared infrastructure (Jodha, 1990; Polanyi, 1944).
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Figure 16. This figure represents the institutional choice of farmers and the voting outcome at
system equilibrium for two levels of non-farm wages to the elite farmers: low wage society
(wE = 0.2), and high wages (wE = 0.8). The Y-axis shows the fraction of population that
chooses the nested institution. The voting majority threshold for the institution to change is
Γ = 0.51.
3.3.3 Analysis III: Effect of Learning
In my model, there is rate of depreciation of the infrastructure. The maintenance effort applied
under either political institution offsets this depreciation. In the preceding section, we saw that
the interventions through formal economic institutions, such as non-farm wage employment,
can flip the system to a nested institution. However, such a flip may not necessarily result in
significant improvements in the infrastructure efficiency. So, it is important to examine the
approach to the steady state, i.e., the rate at which the change in the political institution occurs,
or the steady state is achieved. For this purpose, I examine the parameter φi, which is the
rate of adjustment of the individuals’ mental model. φi may be interpreted as a function of
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knowledge transmission or rate of learning in the system. Depending on the depreciation rate
of the infrastructure and relative adjustment rate of the mental model of the individual, the
approach to steady state can be different (Smith, 1969).
Specifically, I focus on the responsiveness of the poor farmers, φP . I characterize φP
as low learning (φP = 0.3) and high learning (φP = 0.8). Except for the focal parameter,
the remaining parameter values in this section are the same as the high wage scenario in the
preceding section.
Figure 17 illustrates change in infrastructure efficiency as a function of time for high and
low learning states. Regardless of the value of learning rate of the poor farmers,φP , the system
eventually shifts to the nested regime and the infrastructure efficiency is at around 45%. How-
ever, φP affects the transient dynamics of the shift from one political institution to another. A
high value of φP increases the speed of institutional change. That is, at high learning rate, the
system shifts to the nested regime at t = 15, whereas at low learning rate, the regime shift
occurs at t = 73. Even though the regime shift occurs eventually in both cases, the quality of
infrastructure is degraded for an additional 59 years before it is is improved (Figure 17). This
result highlights the relationship between the quality of the physical infrastructure and the rate
of adjustment of the mental model of the elite farmers.
The use of evolutionary dynamics has brought attention to the importance of the norms of
behavior that guide individuals’ decisions. For example, “traditional codes of behavior” can
lead individuals to support social norms even though those norms might be disadvantageous
to the society (Akerlof, 1984, pg.72). The mental models of individuals, and thereby the per-
ceptions about payoffs, is often based on belief-systems that promote the capture of resources
(or wealth) of poor farmers. However, the model predicts that the elite farmers find it in their
own economic interests to abandon the old institution.
The parameter φi speaks to the durability of mental models of individuals. It controls the
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Figure 17. This figure represents the dynamics of infrastructure depreciation over time for
two rates of learning in the mental model of the elites. The X-axis represents time and the
Y-axis represents infrastructure efficiency in %. The two rates of learning are characterized as
low learning (φP = 0.3) and high learning (φP = 0.8). The voting majority threshold for the
institution to change is Γ = 0.51.
information available to individuals, which may be a function of poor human infrastructure
and can be improved through informational interventions, such as access to education. This
result highlights the importance of knowledge transmission through learning, which is an most
important source of change in the long-run (North, 1994).
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3.4 Conclusion
There is a great deal of consensus that economic institutions are a key determinant of economic
performance in a society. (North, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Greif et al., 1994; Greif, 2006;
Wade, 1989). These discussions assume that the political institutions required for specifying
and enforcing these constraints are present. However, there are several documented examples
in developing countries, which lack such political institutions (Bardhan, 2000; Ostrom, 1990).
This assumption about the presence of political institutions leads to many important questions,
perhaps the most interesting of which is why do political institutions differ across societies?
Can a better understanding of the determinants of political institutions enhance my ability to
respond to power asymmetries in a society? This chapter is an effort to address these questions
through an examination of community-managed irrigation systems in North India.
Research on institutional change has examined key questions such as why inferior institu-
tions persist (Greif et al., 1994; Greif, 2006), and why societies fail to adopt the institutional
design of successful ones (Greif, 1998). The work reported here aims to contribute to this
body of scholarship through examining, explicitly, the role of political power as a determinant
of political institutions in societies.
Given power asymmetries, are there patterns in the way societies organize around environ-
mental variability? Is it possible to characterize individuals’ mental models through a more
“realistic” comparison of infrastructure efficiency across different political institutions? Is it
possible to characterize robustness-vulnerability trade-offs of different political institutions?
Further research in this area involves extending my model to address the questions discussed
herein. Through an iterative process of model and data refinement, it may be possible to char-
acterize some basic principles concerning the determinants of political institutions in social-
ecological systems. These principles can help guide policy development regarding long-term
environmental change.
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Chapter 4
INSTITUTIONS WITHOUT ROMANCE: CORRUPTION AND PROVISIONING OF
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN CANAL IRRIGATION SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
The performance of government-managed irrigation systems, which cover about 60% of the
global irrigated area (Burton, 2010), continues to be at the center of irrigation development
debates. Regardless of whether performance is defined based on technical efficiency (Molden
et al., 1998), or equity in water distribution (Malano and van Hofwegen, 1999), the literature
suggests that performance of such systems in several developing countries continues to decline
(Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014; Mukherji et al., 2009; Malano and van Hofwegen, 1999).
There is a general agreement that poor performance may be caused by poor maintenance of
the irrigation infrastructure, itself a consequence of the existing institutional arrangements for
infrastructure management (Groenfeldt et al., 2000). One way to improve the provision of irri-
gation infrastructure is to build on the role of bureaucrats who may shape irrigation outcomes
through their direct interactions with farmers (Senanayake et al., 2015; Suhardiman and Gior-
dano, 2014). Examples of such bureaucrats include canal engineers and other appointed field
staff who repair canals and distribute water.
Irrigation reform discussions that focused on enhancing the role of bureaucrats have pre-
viously dissociated politics from their analysis and assume benevolence on the part of the bu-
reaucrat (Moe, 2006). Among the most consistent themes in the literature on bureaucracies is
the conclusion that a budget-maximizing bureaucrat will oversupply public goods, relative to
the level of provision preferred by the typical politician, because of the monopolistic power of
the bureaucrat over public resources (Niskanen, 1971, 1975; Breton and Wintrobe, 1975; Tul-
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lock, 1965). The objective of the bureaucrats in these models is to maximize their individual
utility (wages, benefits, power, etc.) by maximizing the budget of their office. These models,
however, do not include corruption as a way to satisfy these objectives.
In contrast to the over-provision hypothesis, empirical evidence indicates that much of the
under-investment in canal irrigation systems in the Indian subcontinent has been attributed
to corruption in the irrigation bureaus that maintain the irrigation infrastructure (Wade, 1982;
Mollinga, 2001, 2003; Rinaudo, 2002). This suggests that bureaucrats may not simply be ‘pub-
lic servants’ as assumed by previous studies, andmay threaten provision of public infrastructure
by their exercise of monopolistic power over public resources.
Existing theories of bureaucratic oversight use the principal-agent framework to propose
ways in which politicians may counter the bureaucrat’s capacity to manipulate information
and limit their monopolistic power over public resources (Wade, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast,
1984). For instance, in the context of budgeting, politicians may restrain bureaucratic manip-
ulation through monitoring (McCubbins et al., 1987; Weingast and Moran, 1983). However,
this literature has four limitations.
The first limitation is that most of the existing models that examine corruption focus ex-
plicitly on the U.S. system (Becker, 1983; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Lui, 1986; Klitgaard, 1988),
which has relatively lower levels of outright bribery (extralegal cash transfers) in the bureau-
cracy compared to many developing nations that are characterized by poor infrastructure pro-
vision (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018).
The second limitation is that none of the existing studies on corruption extend the principal-
agent framework to study the provision of public infrastructure. So, it is not well understood
how monitoring may affect infrastructure provision.
The third limitation is that the studies that take the principal-agent approach to examine
corruption are biased towards bureaucratic (agent) corruption and do not consider the potential
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complicity of the politician (principal). In countries like India, a dishonest politicianmay, often,
misuse their power to pressure the irrigation bureau to rakemoney off the public funds allocated
for provision of public irrigation infrastructure (Wade, 1982; Thompson, 2000). In such cases,
corruption among politicians and bureaucrats prevails as an informal norm, and they both act to
maximize their own selfish interests rather than being compliant agents maximizing the social
welfare of farmers.
Last, due to information asymmetry in principal-agent interactions, monitoring can be an
imperfect instrument and impose significant costs for detecting shirking behavior of bureau-
crats (McCubbins et al., 1987). The reason for this is that due to irreducible uncertainty, no
matter how carefully the consequences of principal-agent interactions are monitored, there can
be indeterminacy about the extent to which a bureaucrat applied their best efforts to maintain
the infrastructure. In the context of irrigation systems, climate uncertainty may exacerbate the
problem of information asymmetry regarding the bureaucrat’s provision efforts. The effect of
natural stochasticity on the likelihood of corruption and infrastructure provision is not well
understood.
To address the gap left by studies on corruption, I developed a stylized principal-agent
model that characterizes infrastructure provision under a discrete monitoring technology to
examine how institutional and environmental factors affect (i) the likelihood of corruption, and
(ii) the infrastructure provision efforts. I focus specifically on the politician’s incentive to be
corrupt and the infrastructure provision efforts by the bureaucrat under corrupt and non-corrupt
regimes.
4.2 The Model
I consider a government-managed agricultural system that is irrigated through gravity flow
canal systems. I assume that the central authority is the politician, who appoints the public
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official or bureaucrat.3 This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence from irrigation
systems in South India (Wade, 1982). The irrigated command area is fed from infrastructure
constructed, operated and maintained by the bureaucrat. There is a third population of citizens
(farmers), that I do not directly consider in this model. In the model, I assume that the politi-
cian’s preferences about infrastructure provision capture the importance of infrastructure to the
electorate and for being reelected.
The bureaucrat has an appropriated budget that is used to pay for maintenance. This budget
is approved by the politician’s office. The politician, however, can only observe the quality
of infrastructure, which is a noisy signal of the bureaucrat’s effort. Therefore, the problem
is whether compensation to the bureaucrat can only be adjusted at the margin based on their
performance. I examine two institutional responses to this problem.
The first institution defines a output-based contract between the politician and the bureau-
crat, where the latter may be removed from office for non-performance. That is, if the bureau-
crat’s effort (input) falls below a certain level of infrastructure provision (output), they may be
fired. This characterizes many bureaus that don’t allow for performance-based compensation
structures and operate only at the extensive margin of the bureaucrat (Heckman et al., 1997;
Heinrich, 1999; Wade, 1982). I characterize this interaction as non-corrupt and treat this as the
baseline institutional structure.
The second institutional structure is one where the politician receives a bribe from the
bureaucrat that is proportional to the latter’s provision efforts. Therefore, the bureaucrat’s
compensation is variable in the bribe. Under this institutional structure, both the bureaucrat and
the politician are subject to governmental oversight, and they might get caught (McCubbins
3The principal-agent model presented here represents hierarchy within a bureaucracy or a politician-
bureaucrat relationship. For simple exposition, I assume a politician-bureaucrat interaction.
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et al., 1987). Since the complicity of politicians with bureaucrats allows them to utilize public
funds for personal gain, I characterize this interaction as corrupt.
The overall decision process on infrastructure provisioning is a two-stage game. In the
first stage, the politician chooses between corrupt (C) and non-corrupt (NC) strategies. In the
second stage, the bureaucrat chooses their level of effort (M ) based on the politician’s strategy.
I assume that the politician and bureaucrat are risk-neutral. For the remainder of the discussion,
I use the following notation to denote the utilities and strategies of the bureaucrat and politician:
Ui(ΓB,ΓP ), where i denotes the players: bureaucrat (B) and politician (P ), and Γi denotes
the strategy of player i..
4.2.1 Non-corrupt Bureaucrat and Non-corrupt Politician
I start with the interaction of a non-corrupt politician and a non-corrupt bureaucrat. The per-
formance of the bureaucrat, q, is assumed to be equal to their effort in maintenance of the
infrastructure, M , plus a shock, ϵ: q = M + ϵ. By shock, I refer to extreme weather events,
such as floods, that may result in deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure. I assume that
the shock is revealed to the players after the contract is chosen. ϵ is the realization of a weather
event.
I characterize the players’ beliefs over possible shocks as a diffuse prior with a uniform
distribution with zero mean between the limits [−β/2,β/2]. That is, the players’ beliefs assign
a positive probability to the true state of the world before the shock is revealed. β describes the
range of possible weather events. An increase in the value of β reflects uncertainty about the
range of possible weather events, which may reflect a more uncertain climate regime (Milly
et al., 2002).
The bureaucrat chooses a level of effort,MNC , that maximizes their net earnings and their
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utility function is represented by
UB(NC,NC) = max
MNC
[wPr(q > T )− ψ(MNC)] (4.1)
where w is the wage earned by the bureaucrat, which is conditional on the infrastructure
provision being above the threshold, T . wPr(q > T ) reflects an all-or-nothing contract
with no performance-based payment. That is, the bureaucrat gets paid if the threshold con-
dition is met and conditional on getting paid, the bureaucrat’s compensation does not depend
on their performance. For simplicity, the cost-of-effort function is assumed to be quadratic:
ψ(MNC) =
θM2NC
2
, where θ is the marginal cost of effort.
The politician’s benefit, on the other hand, is tied to the bureaucrat’s performance and they
incur a cost equal to the compensation paid to the bureaucrat. The politician’s expected utility
function is given by
UP (NC,NC) = E[q − wPr(q > T )] = MNC + E[ϵ]− wPr(q > T ) (4.2)
The bureaucrat’s utility function in expression 4.1 may be rewritten as below. Refer to B.1
for the derivation.
UB(NC,NC) = wPr(MNC + ϵ > T )− θM
2
NC
2
=
w
2
− wT
β
+
wMNC
β
− θM
2
NC
2
The bureaucrat balances the increased expected marginal benefit from increasing the prob-
ability of receiving their wage versus the marginal cost of their effort:
UB(NC,NC) = max
MNC
w
2
− wT
β
+
wMNC
β
− θM
2
NC
2
(4.3)
FOC :
w
β
− θMNC = 0
=⇒M∗NC(w, θ, β) =
w
θβ
(4.4)
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Substituting expression 4.4 into expression 4.3, the non-corrupt bureaucrat’s maximized utility
may then be derived as below. Refer to B.1 for the derivation.
UB(NC,NC) = w
[1
2
− T
β
+
w
2θβ2
]
Knowing thatM∗NC =
w
θβ
, the non-corrupt politician’s maximized utility may be derived
as below. Refer to B.1 for the derivation.
UP (NC,NC) = w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
]
− w
2
θβ2
4.2.2 Corrupt Bureaucrat and Corrupt Politician
I now consider the interaction between a corrupt bureaucrat and corrupt politician. Here, I as-
sume that the politician demands a bribe from the bureaucrat based on the latter’s performance.
This assumption is an accurate description of many regimes observed in the developing world
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016).
Given the well-institutionalized system of corruption that surrounds irrigation in India
(Quah, 2008), positions in the irrigation bureau are valuable assets. Not only do bureaucrats
have to pay for transfer to desirable positions, but also a bureaucrat who does not perform
well or who threatens to enforce the law against those who engage in corruption may simply
be transferred somewhere else by the politician. Therefore, given the structure of power and
norms, we may visualize a transaction, in which the bureaucrat pays a bribe to the politician.
Unlike the formal compensation in the non-corrupt contract, bribery can be proportional
to bureaucrat’s performance. That is, the bribes can be adjusted at the intensive margin of the
bureaucrat’s effort, similar to the linear contracts in the agency literature. I assume that the
politician and bureaucrat devise a linear contract of the form:
s = w − (b−Hq)
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where, w is the fixed wage earned by the bureaucrat, b is the maximum feasible bribe that is a
constraint set by norms. I assume that the politician chooses the marginal reduction in the net
bribe, H , that is contingent upon on the performance of the bureaucrat, making the effective
bribe paid by the bureaucrat to the politician equal to: b − Hq. I assume that the maximum
feasible bribe is less than the bureaucrat’s wage, i.e., b < w.
Last, I assume that the the probability of being caught and punished when engaging in
corruption is (1− σ). When this probability is equal to one, both the bureaucrat and politician
get fired and they earn a zero payoff. Hence, σ is the probability of successful corrupt activity.4
Considering σ ∈ [0, 1], the benefit from corruption is given by, σs.
The bribe includes an implicit promise of protection for the bureaucrat here since there is
no longer a threshold of system quality that gets them turned out of their jobs. Presumably, this
is part of why a bureaucrat can be corrupt.
The corrupt bureaucrat balances the increased expected marginal benefit from decreasing
the probability of being caught and the marginal reduction in the net bribe paid to the politi-
cian versus the marginal cost of their effort. Refer to B.2 for the derivation of the first-order
condition:
UB(C,C) = max
MC
E
[
σ
(
w − b+Hq
)
− θM
2
C
2
]
FOC : σHC − θMC = 0 =⇒ MC = σH
θ
(4.5)
The bureaucrat’s performance affects the politician’s payoffs in two ways. First, the main-
tenance effort of the bureaucrat improves the condition of infrastructure, and thereby the im-
proves the possibility of the politician’s reelection. Second, the bribe that the politician re-
ceives from the bureaucrat is proportional to the latter’s effort. The politician’s problem is then
4I assume that the probability of being caught and punished is exogenous to the game. A more general
structure might make this probability an increasing function of the bribe. This assumption simplifies the formal
statement of the model and the exposition that follows.
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to choose a bribe, H , taking as given the bureaucrat’s optimal choice of MC for a given H .
Refer to B.2 for the derivation ofH∗:
UP (C,C) = max
H
E
[
σ
(
q + (b−Hq)− w
)]
FOC :
σ2
θ
− 2Hσ
2
θ
= 0
H∗ =
1
2
=⇒ M∗C(σ, θ) =
σ
2θ
(4.6)
Knowing the values of H∗ andM∗C , the maximized utility functions of the corrupt bureaucrat
and politician may be derived as below. Refer to B.2 for the derivation of the maximized
utilities.
UB(C,C) = σ
[
w − b
]
+
σ2
8θ
UP (C,C) =
σ2
4θ
+ σ[b− w]
4.3 Results
Before I turn to the analysis, let us recall the structure of the two contracts and utilities of the
politician and the bureaucrat. The overall decision process on infrastructure provisioning is
a two-stage game. In the first stage, the politician makes a strategy based on the effort the
bureaucrat is applying. In the second stage, the bureaucrat chooses an effort based on the
contract they are facing.
I assume that the bureaucrat will play the game only if it gives them a positive utility. That
is,
UB(NC,NC) ≥ 0 and,
UB(C,C) ≥ 0
This assumption represents the individual rationality constraint for the bureaucrat. That is, if
the utility is negative, the bureaucrat can break their contract with the politician for an outside
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opportunity. Therefore, the politician chooses a contract that maximizes their expected utility,
subject to the bureaucrat’s participation constraint.
The sequential structure of the game results in a Stackelberg leader-follower equilibrium.
That is, there are two possible pooling equilibria: one is they choose corrupt (C) and the other
is they choose non-corrupt (NC). This is represented in the game tree in Figure 18.
If the politician chooses non-corruption (NC), they write an extensive margin contract
with the bureaucrat. That is, the bureaucrat is removed from the office if they do not meet
the threshold condition for infrastructure provision. Consequently, the bureaucrat chooses a
corresponding level of effort. On the other hand, if the politician chooses to be corrupt (C), they
withhold a portion of the bureaucrat’s pay and then either punish them if the system performs
poorly or “cut them slack” if the system performs well. That is, they devise a contract on the
intensive margin of the bureaucrat’s effort. The maximized utilities of the bureaucrat and the
politician under these possible equilibria are given by:
1. Non-corrupt Bureaucrat and Non-Corrupt Politician: Using backward induction, the bu-
reaucrat chooses the level of effort in the second stage of the game:
UB(NC,NC) = w
[1
2
− T
β
+
w
2θβ2
]
(4.7)
UP (NC,NC) = w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
]
− w
2
θβ2
(4.8)
2. Corrupt Bureaucrat and Corrupt Politician: Using backward induction, the politician
chooses the bribe in the first stage, based on the bureaucrat’s performance that is deter-
mined in the second stage.
UB(C,C) = σ
[
w − b
]
+
σ2
8θ
(4.9)
UP (C,C) =
σ2
4θ
+ σ[b− w] (4.10)
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Politician
UB(NC,NC), UP (NC,NC)
NC
NC
UB(C,C), UP (C,C)
C
C
Bureaucrat
Figure 18. Extensive form of the game.
Table 2 summarizes the definitions all the model parameters. In order to examine the con-
ditions under which the politician chooses corruption, I define IC as the politician’s incentive
to be corrupt. This is simply the difference between the utility of being corrupt and the utility
obtained by being non-corrupt, and is given by:
IC = UP (C,C)− UP (NC,NC)
= σ
[ σ
4θ
+ b− w
]
− w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
− w
θβ2
]
(4.11)
Table 2. Definitions of model parameters
Symbol Definition
w Wage of the bureaucrat
T Infrastructure threshold
β Climate uncertainty
θ Marginal cost of effort to the bureaucrat
σ Probability of corruption not being detected
b Maximum feasible bribe
70
4.3.1 Comparative Statics on the Incentive to be Corrupt
I conduct the comparative statics over three parameters: climate uncertainty (β), probability
of detection (1− σ), and fixed bureaucratic wages (w).
4.3.1.1 Climate Uncertainty
The change in incentive to be corrupt with respect to the climate uncertainty, β, may be shown
by:
∂IC
∂β
=
w
θβ2
+
wT
β2
− 2w
2
θβ3
> 0 (4.12)
Expression 4.12 shows that an increase in the climate uncertainty increases the incentive
to be corrupt at the margin. However, the regime shift to corrupt equilibrium depends on the
degree of climate uncertainty.
At low climate uncertainty, the infrastructure provision is higher in the non-corrupt com-
pared to the corrupt contract because the bureaucrat must apply more effort to achieve the
threshold condition with greater certainty (eq 4.4 and 4.6). Contrarily, as climate uncertainty
increases, the bureaucrat’s effort is higher under the corrupt regime (eq 4.6). Since the politi-
cian derives a benefit from infrastructure provision (eq 4.11), the level of bureaucrat’s provision
effort influences the politician’s incentive to be corrupt.
IC is negative at low climate uncertainty because of higher provision efforts under the
non-corrupt regime (eq 4.11). As the climate uncertainty increases, infrastructure provision is
higher in the corrupt regime, the incentive to be corrupt increases (IC > 0), and the system
reaches a corrupt equilibrium.
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4.3.1.2 Probability of Detection
The change in incentive to be corrupt with respect to the probability of being detected may be
shown by5:
∂IC
∂σ
=
σ
2θ
+ b− w (4.13)
Equation 4.13 shows that the politician’s incentive to be corrupt depends on the value of the
fixed bureaucratic wage,w, relative to the probability of detection, (1−σ), and the bureaucrat’s
cost of effort, θ. If σ < 2θ(w − b) 6 the incentive to be corrupt decreases at the margin as
the probability of detection increases. This result follows directly from the assumption about
the probability of detection reducing the politician’s net earnings in the corrupt contract. If
σ > 2θ(w − b), then the incentive to be corrupt increases at the margin and the system shifts
to a corrupt equilibrium.
4.3.1.3 Bureaucratic Wage
The change in incentive to be corrupt with respect to the fixed bureaucratic wage, w, may be
shown by:
∂IC
∂w
=
2w
θβ2
+
1
2
−
[
σ +
1
θβ
+
T
β
]
(4.14)
The role of bureaucratic wage in the likelihood of corruption is ambiguous and depends on the
degree of climate uncertainty and probability of detection relative to the wage. That is, the
incentive to be corrupt increases at the margin if w > β
2
[
σβ + 1
θ
+ T − β
2
]
. Alternatively, if
this condition fails, the incentive to be corrupt decreases at the margin and the system shifts to
the non-corrupt equilibrium.
5The probability of being caught and punished in the model is assumed to be (1 − σ). Therefore, σ is the
probability of not being detected.
6I assume that the bureaucrat’s fixed wage is greater than the maximum bribe paid to the politician, i.e.,w > b
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4.3.2 Comparative Statics on Infrastructure Provision Effort
4.3.2.1 Corrupt Contract
In the sequential game, the bureaucrat is responding with infrastructure provision. So, in order
to understand the conditions under which infrastructure provision is higher or lower, I examine
the bureaucrat’s performance under the two contracts. The bureaucrat’s effort levels in the
corrupt contract is given by:
M∗C(σ, θ) =
σ
2θ
(4.15)
Expression 4.15 shows that the infrastructure provision under the corrupt regime increases as
the probability of detection, (1 − σ), and the unit cost-of-effort, (θ), decrease. This result
follows directly from the assumptions in the model specification: the gains from corruption
decrease as the probability of detection increases. Therefore, the bureaucrat’s effort under the
corrupt regime declines as the probability of detection increases.
Expression 4.15 also shows that the infrastructure provision under the corrupt contract is
unaffected by climate uncertainty. This is because, due to the linear form of the corrupt contract
and the risk neutrality assumption, the bureaucrat experiences only themean uncertainty, which
is assumed to be zero.
4.3.2.2 Non-Corrupt Contract
On the other hand, the infrastructure provision effort under the non-corrupt equilibrium is given
by:
M∗NC(w, θ, β) =
w
θβ
(4.16)
Expression 4.16 shows that the infrastructure provision effort under the non-corrupt regime
increases with wage of the bureaucrat. This may be explained by the fact that under the non-
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corrupt contract, the bureaucrat’s wage is tied to their performance. Therefore, an increase in
wage results in an increase in their effort level.
Expression 4.16 also shows that the infrastructure provision under the non-corrupt equi-
librium is strictly decreasing in climate uncertainty (β). To recall, the infrastructure provision
threshold condition is given by: M + ϵ > T . For low values of β (low ϵ), the bureaucrat must
apply more effort (M ) in order to meet the provision threshold (T ) with greater certainty. Con-
versely, under high climate uncertainty (high β), the non-corrupt bureaucrat applies smaller
effort to achieve the infrastructure threshold.
4.3.3 Infrastructure Provision and System Outcomes
From the discussion so far, I demonstrate that the key parameters – probability of detection, bu-
reaucratic wages, and climate uncertainty – determine whether the system shifts to the corrupt
or non-corrupt regime. The discussion also highlights that these parameters affect the incen-
tives for infrastructure provision within an equilibrium. However, the effect of corruption on
infrastructure provision effort is ambiguous.
In order to compare the infrastructure provision effort under the corrupt and non-corrupt
regimes, I define ∆M , which is given by the difference between the levels of infrastructure
provision by the bureaucrat under the corrupt and non-corrupt regimes:
∆M = M∗C(σ, θ)−M∗NC(w, θ, β)
=
σ
2θ
− w
θβ
(4.17)
The provision of infrastructure is greater under the corrupt regime if ∆M > 0 and greater
under the non-corrupt regime if∆M < 0.
Based on expressions for IC in eq 4.11 and∆M in eq 4.17, there are four possible outcomes
for corruption and infrastructure provision:
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1. Infrastructure Improving Corrupt Equilibrium: This equilibrium means that the system
in a corrupt regime and the infrastructure provision is greater under the corrupt regime
(∆M > 0, IC > 0).
2. Infrastructure Degrading Corrupt Equilibrium: This equilibrium means that the system
in a corrupt regime and the infrastructure provision is greater under the non-corrupt
regime (∆M < 0, IC > 0).
3. Infrastructure Improving Non-Corrupt Equilibrium: This equilibrium means that the
system in a non-corrupt regime and the infrastructure provision is greater under the non-
corrupt regime (∆M < 0, IC < 0).
4. Infrastructure Degrading Non-Corrupt Equilibrium: This equilibriummeans that the sys-
tem in a non-corrupt regime and the infrastructure provision is greater under the corrupt
regime (∆M > 0, IC < 0).
Table 3 summarizes the possible outcomes for corruption and infrastructure provision effort.
In the remainder of the discussion, I will focus on the conditions under which each of these
four outcomes are possible. The discussion above highlights that the gains to corruption and
the infrastructure provision depend on the policy controls (probability of detection and wage),
and state of the world (climate uncertainty). Therefore, going forward, I will focus on these
three parameters to understandwhen theywill succeed or fail in providing greater infrastructure
provision effort.
Table 3. Possible Outcomes for Corruption and Infrastructure Provision. IC is the incentive
to be corrupt. ∆M > 0 implies the infrastructure provision effort is greater in the corrupt
regime than the non-corrupt regime.
Non-Corrupt Corrupt
Infrastructure Improving IC < 0
∆M > 0
IC > 0
∆M > 0
Infrastructure Degrading IC < 0
∆M < 0
IC > 0
∆M < 0
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4.3.4 Probability of Detection
I derive the following condition for corruption equilibrium from the expression for IC in eq
4.11:
σ
[ σ
4θ
+ b− w
]
> w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
− w
θβ2
]
(4.18)
I also derive a condition for when the infrastructure provision effort is greater under the
corrupt regime (∆M > 0):
σ
2θ
− w
θβ
> 0
=⇒ σ > 2w
β
(4.19)
To examine whether the conditions in expressions 4.18 and 4.19 can be satisfied, the model
mimics different climate scenarios. A high value of β reflects a state of high uncertainty and a
reasonably low value of β indicates low climate uncertainty 7
4.3.4.1 High Climate Uncertainty
Figure 19 illustrates the infrastructure provision effort, as a function of the probability of de-
tection for high and low values of wages, in a state of high climate uncertainty. The figure also
shows the shift from corrupt to non-corrupt regimes andwhether that shift results in an improve-
ment or worsening of infrastructure provision. The graph demonstrates a very intuitive point:
when the climate uncertainty is high, allowing for corruption may yield greater provision of in-
frastructure provision (solid line). This result follows the discussion on the comparative statics
of M∗C (expression 4.15) and M∗NC (expression 4.16): under high climate uncertainty, infras-
tructure provision effort under the corrupt regime can be greater compared to the non-corrupt
regime.
7I determined the high-low values based on the range of feasible values of parameters.
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Figure 19 shows that at low probability of detection, conditions in expressions 4.18 and
4.19 are both satisfied, and the system is in an infrastructure improving corrupt equilibrium
(∆M > 0 and IC > 0). As the probability of detection increases, the gains from corruption
decrease and the system shifts to the non-corrupt regime (expression 4.13). However, this may
yield a worse provision of infrastructure, resulting in an infrastructure degrading non-corrupt
equilibrium (∆M > 0 and IC < 0). The graph also shows that low wages necessitate a higher
probability of detection to push the system into the non-corrupt regime (blue line). Table 4
summarizes these results (cells I and II).
0
Low Wage
High Wage
Non-Corrupt
Corrupt
Regime
Policy Control
Regime Shift
Figure 19. The infrastructure provision effort as a function of probability of detection in a
state of high climate uncertainty. The solid and dotted lines represent the corrupt and
non-corrupt regimes respectively. The blue line indicates low fixed bureaucratic wages and
green line indicates high fixed wages.
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Table 4. Conditions for the corrupt equilibrium and infrastructure provision effort in a state of
high climate uncertainty. MC is the bureaucrat’s infrastructure provision effort in the corrupt
regime andMNC is their effort in the non-corrupt regime.
Non-Corrupt Corrupt
MC > MNC I. Strong monitoring II. Weak Monitoring
MC < MNC
III. Strong monitoring
High wage
IV. Weak monitoring
High wage
4.3.4.2 Low Climate Uncertainty
I examine the outcomes for ∆M and IC in a state of low climate uncertainty. Figure 20 illus-
trates the infrastructure provision effort, as a function of the probability of detection for high
and low wages, in a state of low climate uncertainty. A key takeaway from this graph is that
increasing the probability of detection pushes the system into the non-corrupt equilibrium, but
infrastructure provision effort depends on the wage.
As the probability of detection increases, a high fixed wage to the bureaucrat yields greater
infrastructure provision under the non-corrupt regime compared to the corrupt regime (Figure
20 - dashed green line). This result follows the discussion on the comparative statics onMNC
(expression 4.16): under low uncertainty, infrastructure provision in the non-corrupt regime is
higher than the corrupt regime. Also, MC decreases as the probability of detection increases
(expression 4.15).
Figure 20 shows that when the fixed wages are high, the conditions in expressions 4.18
and 4.19 are not satisfied. As the probability of detection increases, the system shifts to an
infrastructure improving non-corrupt equilibrium (∆M < 0 and IC < 0). Alternatively,
when the fixed wages are low, increasing the probability of detection shifts the system to the
non-corrupt regime (expression 4.13). However, the infrastructure provision in this state can be
worse than the corrupt regime, resulting in an infrastructure degrading non-corrupt equilibrium
(∆M > 0 and IC < 0) (Figure 20). This result is summarized in Table 5 (cells II and III).
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Figure 20. The provision of infrastructure as a function of probability of detection in a state
of low climate uncertainty (low β). The solid and dotted lines represent the corrupt and
non-corrupt regimes respectively. The blue line indicates low bureaucratic wages and green
line indicates high wages.
Table 5. Conditions for the corrupt equilibrium and infrastructure provision effort in a state of
low climate uncertainty. MC is the bureaucrat’s infrastructure provision effort in the corrupt
regime andMNC is their effort in the non-corrupt regime.
Non-Corrupt Corrupt
MC > MNC
I. Strong monitoring
Low wage
II. Weak monitoring
Low wage
MC < MNC
III. Strong monitoring
High wage
IV. Weak monitoring
High wage
4.3.5 Bureaucratic Wage
Recalling the condition for corruption equilibrium from the expression for IC in eq 4.11:
σ
[ σ
4θ
+ b− w
]
> w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
− w
θβ2
]
(4.20)
79
Rewriting the condition for when the infrastructure provision effort is greater under the
corrupt regime (∆M > 0) as:
σ
2θ
− w
θβ
> 0
=⇒ w < βσ
2
(4.21)
We know from expression 4.16 that as wages increase, the infrastructure provision is strictly
increasing under the non-corrupt regime. However, expression 4.14 shows that the regime shift
to non-corrupt equilibrium (IC < 0) depends on the state of climate uncertainty.
Figure 21 illustrates the infrastructure provision effort, as a function of the fixed wage for
high and low probability of detection, in a state of high climate uncertainty. The key takeaway
of this graph is that the politician’s incentive to be corrupt decreases as wage increases (dotted
line). This is because the politician’s benefit from infrastructure provision in the non-corrupt
contract exceeds their benefit in the corrupt contract (expression 4.11). Once the system shifts
to the non-corrupt equilibrium, the infrastructure provision is strictly increasing in wages (ex-
pression 4.16). Table 4 summarizes these results (cells III and IV).
For sufficiently high wages, it is possible that the conditions for IC > 0 (expression 4.20)
and ∆M > 0 (expression 4.21) are not satisfied and the system is in an infrastructure im-
proving non-corrupt equilibrium (Figure 21). The figure also shows an inverse relationship
between the probability of detection and wage. That is, a high probability of detection requires
a small increase in wage to shift the system into the non-corrupt regime (green line).
Figure 22 illustrates the infrastructure provision effort, as a function of the wage for high
and low probability of detection, in a state of low climate uncertainty. The graph shows two
regime shifts in the system. We know from expression 4.16 that the infrastructure provision
effort in the non-corrupt regime strictly increases in wage. At low wages, the system shifts
from corrupt to a non-corrupt regime (dotted line). This is because the politician’s benefit
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Figure 21. The provision of infrastructure as a function of wages in a state of high climate
uncertainty. The solid and dotted lines represent the corrupt and non-corrupt regimes
respectively. The blue line indicates weak monitoring mechanisms and green line indicates
strong monitoring mechanisms.
from infrastructure provision effort in the non-corrupt regime is higher than the corrupt regime
(expression 4.11). However, as the wages increase, the system shifts back to the corrupt regime
with a lower level of infrastructure provision (solid line). This is because the politician’s cost
of paying wages to the bureaucrat far exceed their benefit from infrastructure provision in the
non-corrupt regime (expression 4.11). Figure 22 shows that as wages increase, the condition in
expression 4.19 fails and the system shifts to an infrastructure degrading corrupt equilibrium
(∆M < 0 and IC > 0). These results are summarized in Table 5 (cells III and IV).
4.3.6 Climate Uncertainty
In the final part of the analysis, I examine the effect of climate uncertainty on the corruption
equilibrium and infrastructure provision effort. Rewriting the condition for when the provision
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Figure 22. The provision of infrastructure as a function of wages in a state of low climate
uncertainty. The solid and dotted lines represent the corrupt and non-corrupt regimes
respectively. The blue line indicates weak monitoring mechanisms and green line indicates
strong monitoring mechanisms.
of infrastructure is greater under the corrupt regime (∆M > 0) as:
∆M > 0 =⇒ σ
2
>
w
β
=⇒ β > 2w
σ
(4.22)
Figure 23 illustrates the infrastructure provision effort, as a function of the climate uncer-
tainty for high and low probability of detection. The key takeaway from this figure is that
corruption is more likely as the climate uncertainty increases. This result follows the discus-
sion in the comparative statics for IC (expression 4.12) andMNC (expression 4.16). We know
from expression 4.12 that at low climate uncertainty, IC is negative even though it is increasing
at the margin. This result is represented by the first regime shift in figure 23. As the climate
uncertainty increases, the provision of the infrastructure is degrading under the non-corrupt
regime (expression 4.16) and at relatively high uncertainty, IC is positive. This is represented
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by the second regime shift in Figure 23, which shows that as climate uncertainty increases, the
condition in expressions 4.22 and 4.20 are satisfied, and the system can reach an infrastructure
improving corrupt equilibrium (∆M > 0 and IC > 0).
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Figure 23. The provision of infrastructure as a function of climate uncertainty. The solid and
dotted lines represent the corrupt and non-corrupt regimes respectively. The blue line
indicates weak monitoring mechanisms and green line indicates strong monitoring
mechanisms.
4.4 Discussion
Improving the efficiency of irrigation infrastructure is arguably a high priority for several de-
veloping countries. Yet, empirical evidence shows that the condition of irrigation infrastructure
continues to decline in countries like India due to political and bureaucratic corruption. Casual
empiricism indicates that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and reduces provision
of public goods (De Soto, 1989). Wade and Chambers (1980) and Wade (1984) indicated
that nearly 50 percent of the funds allocated by the government for maintenance of irrigation
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infrastructure was wasted in corruption. In spite of research showing the negative effects of cor-
ruption on irrigation performance in government-managed irrigation systems (Rinaudo, 2002),
few studies have examined this issue.
To make matters worse, there is little to no understanding of the role of corruption in the
context of climate uncertainty. In a world of increasing threats from climate uncertainty, this
is an important relationship to understand. The model provides a framework for analyzing
the equilibrium behavior of the politician and public good provision by the bureaucrat under
different scenarios of climate uncertainty. The key predictions may be summarized as:
1. When the climate uncertainty is high, allowing for corruption may yield greater provi-
sion of infrastructure provision (Figure 19). This suggests that cracking down on cor-
ruption is beneficial only when infrastructure provision is degrading.
2. In a state of low climate uncertainty, the model predicts that cracking down on corruption
pushes the system into a non-corrupt equilibrium. However, the state of infrastructure
provision depends on the wages of the bureaucrat (Figure 20). This suggests a comple-
mentary role of wage increases and corruption eradication efforts.
3. As we continue to face an increased uncertainty in the climate, wages play an important
role in determining if corruption may be curbed and infrastructure provision may be
improved.
The first key result of the model is that in the context of government-managed irrigation
systems, cracking down on corruption is beneficial only when the provision of infrastructure in
the corrupt regime is worse than in the non-corrupt regime. The important policy implication of
this result is that under high climate uncertainty, allowing for corruption, or a low probability
of its detection, can yield greater infrastructure provision efforts (Figures 19 and 23). It is
important to understand the counterfactual of this result, i.e., the effect of curbing corruption
on infrastructure provision efforts in a state of high climate uncertainty.
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Themodel predicts that while increasing the probability of detection pushes the system into
a non-corrupt equilibrium, the state of infrastructure may be degrading under the non-corrupt
scenario. While the notion of climate uncertainty in corruption studies is yet to be explored, the
idea of allowing for corruption is not novel. This result is consistent with the extant literature,
which suggests that allowing for bureaucratic corruption may, sometimes, be the optimal thing
to do, particularly in the context of developing countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Acemoglu
and Verdier, 1998).
The second key result of themodel is the importance of bureaucratic wages. In a state of low
climate uncertainty, themodel shows that while cracking down on corruption pushes the system
into a non-corrupt equilibrium, the state of infrastructure provision depends on the wages of
the bureaucrat (Figure 20). I find that the under low climate uncertainty, in systems with high
bureaucratic wages, there is a need for stronger monitoring mechanisms to curb corruption. In
such cases, increasing the probability of detection in scenarios where bureaucrats have high
wages may result in a higher provision of infrastructure in the non-corrupt regime (Figure 20).
The importance of adequate wages in relation to curbing corruption has been widely
discussed in the corruption literature (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984;
Myrdal, 1972), and the conclusions are ambiguous. The model also predicts that in a state of
low climate uncertainty, if the fixed wages are high, the system can be in a corrupt equilibrium
with a lower state of infrastructure provision (Figure 22).
On the other hand, “shirking models” of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Becker and Stigler
(1974) predict that in the presence of low probability of detection, higher wage is necessary to
eliminate corruption. Interestingly, the model predicts this result in the state of high climate
uncertainty (Figure 21). In such cases, infrastructure provision may improve in the non-corrupt
regime only if the wages are very high.
Last, in a state of low climate uncertainty, the model predicts that even in the presence
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of strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, corruption may prevail when wages of
bureaucrats are high (Figure 22). The model predicts that in such cases, the provision of infras-
tructure is degrading under the corrupt regime. This result is consistent with the observations
of Wade (1982), which concludes that in spite of strong monitoring procedures, executive engi-
neers, who are among the high-ranked bureaucrats in the irrigation bureau, continue to conceal
their receipt and passing on of illicit funds. The fact that the exchange of illicit funds is encour-
aged, and is often demanded, by the politician reduces the effectiveness of these monitoring
mechanisms (Wade, 1982, pg.309). Furthermore, Wade (1982) and Mollinga (2003) empha-
size that in South Indian canal irrigation systems, corruption among high-ranked bureaucrats
and politicians functions an informal institution and plays a major role in the poor maintenance
of irrigation infrastructure.
The non-monotonic nature of the tradeoffs between corruption and infrastructure provision
in the model shows that there is not a “panacea”, one-size-fits-all policy approach. Anticipat-
ing institutional responses to climate change is especially critical for managers of irrigation
infrastructure. However, it is important to understand the nexus of climate uncertainty, the
remuneration in non-corrupt systems, and monitoring effectiveness before making policy rec-
ommendations.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The objective of this research was to better understand how institutions for provision of
shared infrastructure are crafted and sustained, and the consequences they generate for resource
use in diverse settings. I addressed these questions by studying irrigation systems in India. I
used a combination of stylized mathematical models to examine human-environment interac-
tions and, specifically, the incentives that motivate actors to engage in the provision of shared
infrastructure. My findings demonstrate the importance of formal interventions, such as water
pricing instruments, rural non-farm wage employment, and bureaucratic wages, to improve the
provision of irrigation infrastructure. I also show the important role that informal institutions,
such as informational interventions, may play in inducing better infrastructure provision.
In Chapter 2, I examined how the presence of shared and private infrastructure may affect
the provision of shared infrastructure and system productivity. Using a stylized replicator dy-
namic model, I demonstrated that an integrated set of institutions, such as a fixed groundwater
fee and a volumetric fee on tank users that is differentiated based on where users are located in
the system, can improve system productivity and equality. I calibrated the model parameters
to replicate and predict outcomes in tank irrigation systems in South India.
The next extension of my inquiry was to examine the effect of social factors on institutions.
In Chapter 3, I examine the role of power asymmetries between resource users as a determinant
for the political institutions that govern infrastructure provision. I developed a stylized com-
partmental model to track the institutional preference of elites and non-elites in an irrigation
system. I use this mental model to examine the effect of policy tools, such as non-farm wage
employment and informational interventions, on the persistence of two different types of politi-
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cal institutions in a canal irrigation system: self-governed and nested governance. My findings
show that improving non-farm wage employment opportunities can shift the system to a nested
institution, which typically has higher infrastructure provision. However, in order to accelerate
the rate of change such that it is not too late to improve infrastructure provisions, changes to
informal institutions, such as informational interventions and learning, may be required.
Last, I examine the role of political factors as determinants of infrastructure provision in
Chapter 4. Using a stylized principal-agent model, I examine the effect of political and ad-
ministrative corruption on infrastructure provision in a canal irrigation system. Specifically,
I examined how institutional and environmental factors affect (i) the likelihood of corruption,
and (ii) the provision of infrastructure. My model results suggest that in the face of increas-
ing uncertainty in environmental shocks, a crackdown on extralegal side payments through
monitoring mechanisms may result in inferior infrastructure provision. I also demonstrate that
by focusing on bureaucratic wages, we can curb corruption as well as improve infrastructure
provision.
Agriculture contributes to nearly 20% of India’s GDP. In spite of enormous investments
by the Indian government in its management, poor irrigation infrastructure remains a critical
factor for low yields and water productivity (Shah, 2009). This raises serious concerns for
food security. My research is a step towards understanding the determinants of infrastructure
provision and crafting policies to improve its management. Though that models I developed in
this thesis are stylized, they capture key human-environment interactions that are representative
of several irrigation systems in India. Moreover, the models allow us to assess the potential
gains to individuals for different policy interventions. In the future, through an iterative process
of model and data refinement, the models developed in this thesis can offer valuable insights
to policymakers about crafting effective institutions for improving infrastructure quality and
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agricultural productivity. I contend that this work is in the spirit of extending Ostrom’s (2007)
call for moving beyond panaceas to produce actionable solutions for policymakers.
The implications of my work also extend beyond the specific case study contexts. The
challenge of public infrastructure provision in human societies in not unique to irrigation sys-
tems. As world populations continue to rise, the demand for scarce resources is increasing,
resulting in greater demand for the provision of existing physical infrastructures. For instance,
we observe this trend in the need for better maintenance of the public electric grid as soci-
eties shift to decentralized energy systems (Castaneda et al., 2017). There is also a need for
building more road infrastructure as traffic congestion continues to rise (Joanis, 2011). What
unifies these systems is the similarity of the political-economic factors that drive or impede the
infrastructure provision. I contend that my research demonstrates how to operationalize the
CIS framework and develop theory-rich models that can characterize policy recommendations
for infrastructure provision in social-ecological systems.
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Table 6. Definitions of State Variables and Parameters
Symbol Definition
Dynamical and decision variables
I Efficiency of the shared infrastructure
XE Fraction of elite farmers whose preference over governance is nested regime
XP Fraction of poor farmers whose preference over governance is nested regime
V Voting outcome
pii,S Payoff of farmer in group i under self-governance regime
pii,J Payoff of farmer in group i under nested regime
t Time
Parameters
ν Marginal productivity of the maintenance investment
σ Scaling parameter
µ Natural siltation rate of the tank
ai Acreage of farmer in group i
li Farm labor of farmer in group i
α, β, γ Output elasticities of acreage, labor, and water
ψ Marginal maintenance fee under self-governance regime
θ Marginal maintenance fee under nested regime
ρi Price per unit of production input of farmer in group i
wi Non-farm wage to farmer in group i
ξ Surface of the farmland
φ Responsiveness of individuals to economic payoffs
Ωi Voting weights of farmer in group i
Γ Voting threshold condition
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This section shows the derivations of the first-order conditions and the maximized utility
functions of the bureaucrat and politician for the corrupt and non-corrupt contracts.
B.1 Non-corrupt Bureaucrat and Non-corrupt Politician
The non-corrupt bureaucrat’s utility function may be derived as:
UB(NC,NC) = wPr(MNC + ϵ > T )− θM
2
NC
2
= wPr(ϵ > T −MNC)− θM
2
NC
2
= w(1− Pr(ϵ < T −MNC))− θM
2
NC
2
= w(1− f(T −MNC))− θM
2
NC
2
ϵ ∼ U [−β
2
,
β
2
]
= w
(
1− T −MNC +
β
2
β
)
− θM
2
NC
2
= w
( β
2
− T +MNC
β
)
− θM
2
NC
2
=
w
2
− wT
β
+
wMNC
β
− θM
2
NC
2
Knowing thatM∗NC =
w
θβ
, the non-corrupt politician’s maximized utility may be derived
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as
UP (NC,NC) = MNC + E[ϵ]− wPr(MNC + ϵ > T )
= MNC + E[ϵ]− wPr(ϵ > T −MNC)
= MNC − w(1− Pr(ϵ < T −MNC))
= MNC − w(1− f(T −MNC))
ϵ ∼ U [−β
2
,
β
2
]
= MNC − w
(
1− T −MNC +
β
2
β
)
= MNC − w
( β
2
− T +MNC
β
)
= MNC − w
2
− wT
β
+
wMNC
β
SubstitutingM∗NC =
w
θβ
:
=
w
θβ
− w
2
+
wT
β
− w
β
.
w
θβ
UP (NC,NC) = w
[ 1
θβ
− 1
2
+
T
β
]
− w
2
θβ2
B.2 Corrupt Bureaucrat and Corrupt Politician
The corrupt bureaucrat balances the increased expected marginal benefit from decreasing the
probability of being caught and the marginal reduction in the net bribe paid to the politician
versus the marginal cost of their effort:
UB(C,C) = max
MC
E
[
σ
(
w − b+Hq
)
− θM
2
C
2
]
= σ
(
w − b+HMC
)
+ σH E(ϵ)− θM
2
C
2
= σ
(
w − b+HMC
)
− θM
2
C
2
FOC : σHC − θMC = 0
=⇒ MC = σH
θ
(B.1)
The politician’s problem is to choose a bribe, H , taking as given the bureaucrat’s optimal
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choice ofMC for a givenH:
UP (C,C) = max
H
E
[
σ
(
q + (b−Hq)− w
)]
= σ
(
MC + b−HMC − w
)
+ E[ϵ]−H E[ϵ]
= σ
(
MC + b−HMC − w
)
SubstitutingMC =
σH
θ
=
σ2H
θ
+ σb− σ
2H2
θ
− σw
FOC :
σ2
θ
− 2Hσ
2
θ
= 0
H∗ =
1
2
=⇒ M∗C(σ, θ) =
σ
2θ
Knowing the values ofH∗ andM∗C , the maximized utility functions of the corrupt bureau-
crat and politician may be rewritten as
UB(C,C) = σ
[
w − b+ 1
2
.
σ
2θ
]
− θ
2
(
σ
2θ
)2
= σ
[
w − b
]
+
σ2
4θ
− σ
2
8θ
=⇒ UB(C,C) = σ
[
w − b
]
+
σ2
8θ
(B.2)
UP (C,C) =
σ2
θ
.
1
2
+ σb− σ
2
θ
.
1
4
− σw
=
σ2
2θ
+ σb− σ
2
4θ
− σw
=⇒ UP (C,C) = σ
2
4θ
+ σ[b− w] (B.3)
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